

The legalization of Hinomaru and Kimigayo as Japan's national flag and anthem and its connections to the political campaign of "healthy nationalism and internationalism"

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Vår 2003

Introduction

The main focus of this thesis is the legalization of Hinomaru and Kimigayo as the national flag and anthem of Japan in 1999 and its connections to what seems to be an atypical Japanese form of postwar nationalism. In the 1980s a campaign headed by among others Prime Minister Nakasone was promoted to increase the pride of the Japanese in their nation and to achieve a “transformation of national consciousness”.¹ Its supporters tended to use the term “healthy nationalism and internationalism”.

When discussing the legalization of Hinomaru and Kimigayo as the national flag and anthem of Japan, it is necessary to look into the nationalism that became evident in the 1980s and see to what extent the legalization is connected with it. Furthermore we must discuss whether the legalization would have been possible without the emergence of so-called “healthy nationalism and internationalism”.

Thus it is first necessary to discuss and try to clarify the confusing terms of “healthy nationalism and patriotism”. Secondly, we must look into why and how the so-called “healthy nationalism and internationalism” occurred and address the question of why its occurrence was controversial.

The field of education seems to be the area of Japanese society where the controversy regarding its occurrence was strongest. The Ministry of Education, Monbushō, and the Japan Teachers' Union, Nihon Kyōshokuin Kumiai (hereafter Nikkyōso), were the main opponents struggling over the issue of Hinomaru, and especially Kimigayo, due to its lyrics praising the emperor. Accordingly one must discuss the connection between the imperial institution and Kimigayo, the base on which much resistance is built, before trying to clarify in what way the political

campaign of so-called “healthy nationalism and internationalism” influenced the field of education.

In this respect we cannot avoid asking to what extent the influence on the field of education formed the basis of the law recognizing Hinomaru and Kimigayo as the national flag and national anthem.

Finally it is important to address the present situation, where the use of the national flag and the national anthem at school ceremonies has reached levels close to 100 %. The question must be asked whether the aim concerning a transformation of national consciousness has been achieved through the campaign of healthy nationalism, the use of Hinomaru and Kimigayo at school ceremonies and the legalization of the national symbols.

Chapter 1: The immediate background for the legalization of Hinomaru and Kimigayo

On February 28th 1999 principal Ishikawa at Sera senior high school in Hiroshima prefecture committed suicide.² He had been exposed to pressure concerning the singing of Kimigayo at the graduation ceremony by the local school board, teachers and the Buraku Liberation League, which works against discrimination of minorities in school.

In 1989 Monbushō issued a revision of the education guidelines that for the first time made the use of Hinomaru and Kimigayo at entrance and graduation ceremonies mandatory.³ Previously it had been desirable. Since Nikkyōso opposed their use among others because of the symbols' war connection, many schools had avoided them.

Since the 1989 revision the use increased and according to the Monbushō national survey in 1998, more than 98% of public schools used Hinomaru and more than 80% Kimigayo.⁴ However, there were exceptions. Hiroshima was a prefecture where the use of Kimigayo remained low. In 1998 only 11,7 % of the senior high schools used Kimigayo at the graduation ceremony.⁵

How is this to be accounted for? When explaining the variations regarding compliance to the instructions, Yoshino lists the experience of the Second World War as a reason why areas such as Hiroshima and Okinawa have shown low support.⁶ However, this explanation does not hold water for Nagasaki, which also suffered from atomic bombing, but where the percentages have been high.

In 1987⁸ only about 25 percent of the teachers in Nagasaki were organized, which may explain why all schools hoisted Hinomaru and used Kimigayo at both ceremonies

in 1999.⁹ In Hiroshima about 55 percent of the teachers were organized in 1998,¹⁰ which may be another explanation for the opposition.

Due to the opposition Monbushō instructed a “correction” in May 1998. As a result the Hiroshima Prefectural Board of Education in February 1999 through the exceptional measure of “an order to do one’s duty”, demanded senior high school principals to make sure Kimigayo was used at the graduation ceremonies.¹¹ Numerous teachers objected and, like many other principals, Ishikawa repeatedly held meetings to solve the problem.

In addition to the objecting teachers, the Buraku Liberation League threatened that if Kimigayo were sung at the ceremony, the minority pupils would boycott it.

“For minorities in Japan, trapped in a marginal status without access to the high-status positions afforded to other members of the society, the Emperor, together with the flag and the anthem, have become symbols of the discrimination against them.”¹²

A minority boycott would show who were minority members, which the representatives found unacceptable, due to discrimination. Thus the most convenient situation would be that Kimigayo was not sung, meaning the boycott could be avoided. However, the local school board ordered the singing. Though he tried to find a solution, the principal failed, and in the morning the day before the ceremony he hung himself. The ceremony was held as scheduled. Teachers and students did not sing Kimigayo, nor was the melody played. Hinomaru was displayed on the stage but halfway through the ceremony the curtain was lowered and the flag was no longer visible.¹³

Three days before the suicide, Prime Minister Obuchi stated he was not considering the legislation of Hinomaru and Kimigayo.¹⁴ However, the suicide caused public

commotion and huge headlines. Chief Cabinet Secretary Nonaka commented that if the decision were entrusted to schools, tragic incidents would occur and expressed that he wanted the legal formalizing of the symbols.¹⁵ On March 4th he spoke of the national flag and anthem as “based on a long lasting custom”¹⁶ and said legislation would not change the use in schools.¹⁷ The Minister of Education Yūma also made a similar statement in Parliament.¹⁸

However, this was a point on which the members of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) did not necessarily agree. Some wanted the mandatory use of Hinomaru and Kimigayo at entrance and graduation ceremonies included in the law. LDP Chief Secretary Murakami said: “To make [the symbols] mandatory is natural. If it is left to the schools to decide, nothing will change and confusion will also occur.”¹⁹

Concerning the issue Prime Minister Obuchi commented:

”I thought it was not necessary to legalize the national flag and anthem, because... Hinomaru and Kimigayo as the national flag and anthem have been established, based on a long lasting custom and because they have taken a firm hold on a wide range of the people.

However...as we proceed towards the 21st century and furthermore, as there among the foreign countries are countries that have legalized the national flag and the national anthem, we have at this time begun to consider legalizing the national flag and the national anthem, because we think the time has come for our country, which has written laws as its principal, to consider rooting the national flag anthem more deeply through a written law.”²⁰

A 1978 opinion poll showed that 92 percent thought Hinomaru appropriate as “the national flag”, while the Kimigayo percentage as regards “the national anthem” was 80.7.²¹ However, in late June 1999 the opinion seemed more divided, especially regarding Kimigayo. Though the flag was the same, Hinomaru was not referred to as

“the national flag”, as mentioned above. Instead merely the expression “the flag” was used. While 79 percent confirmed harboring friendly feelings towards “the flag” Hinomaru, 65 percent answered yes concerning “the song” Kimigayo. 31 percent said no regarding harboring friendly feelings towards Kimigayo.²²

Supporters of the government such as the Liberal Party argued since most Japanese and foreigners acknowledge Hinomaru and Kimigayo as the national flag and anthem, legalization was the natural solution.²³ New Komeito said the symbols have taken root deeply in the Japanese population. As such the party considered it a matter concerning the foundation of Japan. Though the party recognized that to some people the symbols are connected with militarism, speaking of the “Peace Constitution”, it stressed that the symbols would not lead to the revival of militarism and saw legalization as an option.²⁴

Also the Democratic Party of Japan commented that most people within Japan and abroad recognize Hinomaru and Kimigayo as Japan’s national flag and anthem. However, many party members opposed legislation. It mentioned the opposition some people felt and the need of an education raising a correct understanding of the symbols. Furthermore, the party emphasized the need to achieve national consensus.²⁵

Yomiuri Shimbun supported the conservative forces’ arguments and mentioned international sports events and the UN as arenas where the symbols are taken for granted. It said most people in the world think Hinomaru and Kimigayo are the national flag and anthem of Japan. “However, within Japan there is only one group of people who do not recognize the national flag and the national anthem, thus causing confusion in the school arena.”²⁶ It argued that if the confusion in the schools continued, legislation could be considered.²⁷

Critics claimed that the government was cunningly taking advantage of the suicide. Both the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and Japan Communist Party (JCP) opposed legislation. SDP did not recognize the symbols, but stressed that the issue should be left for the people to decide. It also emphasized that to people of Asia Hinomaru and Kimigayo were symbols of warfare.²⁸ JCP opposed Hinomaru and Kimigayo and emphasized their lack of any legal foundation. It criticized the legislation as an implementation from above without achieving the consensus of the people, and urged the need to create a new national flag and anthem suitable for modern Japan.²⁹

Asahi Shimbun³⁰ was more in line with the opposing parties and said that it was unfortunate that the school arena was confused over the issue. Thus it was necessary to think of measures in order to prevent tragedies. However, it argued that legislation would not solve the problem and that using legislation to deal with the school situation was to do things in the wrong order. The newspaper saw the enforcement in the schools of a problem over which adults were divided, as a reason for the current confused situation.

Nonaka said legislation would not mean force. Asahi³¹ argued against this saying the use was already practically mandatory and legislation would reinforce this. It pointed out that in Hiroshima senior high schools principals who did not sing or play Kimigayo, were punished for not following “the order to do one’s duty.” In Hiroshima during the school year April 1998 to March 1999 as many as 155 principals were punished; 17 got an official warning, while 136 became the object of “instructions”.³² The newspaper said that adding to the pressure through legislation and silencing opposing opinions were not democratic methods and would only cause bad feelings.

While Yomiuri Shimbun blamed one group of people – the teachers - for causing confusion in schools, Asahi Shimbun³³ blamed Monbushō. It said that the guidelines on education that made Hinomaru and Kimigayo mandatory were to blame, and that to push through the legislation in a hurry by piling up even more unreasonableness on the present unreasonableness would not solve the school problem.

Critics such as JCP, SDP and Asahi Shimbun³⁴ said the solution would be to reverse the guidelines and urged for a thorough discussion to establish consensus instead of a rash method aimed at the school arena. However, the bill codifying Hinomaru and Kimigayo as the national flag and anthem was submitted to the Diet on June 11th, 1999.³⁵

Before 1945 the official meaning of Kimigayo had been “the emperor’s reign”. However, after the war Monbushō gave no formal interpretation. “The Ministry did not formally deny the pre-war interpretation either.”³⁶ The Prime Minister’s Office states there is no official translation of Kimigayo.³⁷ A common translation is Chamberlain’s. (1850-1935).

<i>Kimigayo wa</i>	Thousands of years of happy reign be thine;
<i>Chiyo ni yachiyo ni</i>	Rule on, my lord, till what are pebbles now
<i>Sazare-ishi no</i>	By age united to mighty rocks shall grow
<i>Iwao to narite</i>	Whose venerable sides the moss doth line.
<i>Koke no musu made</i>	

In connection with the deliberation of the bill the government presented its interpretation of the meaning of the symbols at the first deliberations in the House of Representatives on June 29th, 1999.

Prime Minister Obuchi said it is appropriate to interpret Kimi as the emperor, who is the symbol of Japan and of the unity of the Japanese people.³⁸ Regarding the lyrics he said that it is appropriate to interpret the words as a prayer for lasting peace and the prosperity of Japan. In early June, Obuchi also explained that before the war Kimigayo meant an era reigned by His Majesty the Emperor. However, after the war it means an era not reigned by the emperor, thus it is an era reigned by the people themselves.³⁹

In connection with the deliberation of the bill on June 29th, 1999 Obuchi revised his interpretation.⁴⁰ This explanation concerning Hinomaru was quite similar, except for the fact that the prayer for the lasting peace and prosperity of Japan was changed to “a prayer for the lasting peace and stability of our country”. He also emphasized that when speaking of the emperor, it is the emperor, based on the general will of the people, with whom sovereignty lies, that is indicated.⁴¹

However, this does not mean that the people accept the official interpretation.⁴² According to the 1999 opinion poll, 50 percent said they thought the government’s interpretation of Kimi as the emperor as the symbol of Japan and of the unity of the Japanese people was correct, while 40 percent did not see it this way.⁴³

An absolute majority passed the law concerning the national flag and anthem on July 22nd (the vote was 403 to 86) in the Lower House. It was enacted by the Upper House on August 9th by the vote 166 to 71,⁴⁴ and was promulgated and put into force on August 13th.⁴⁵ The LDP, the Liberal Party, and New Komeito voted in favor, while JCP and SPD voted against. The Democratic Party of Japan was divided over the issue. In the Upper House 20 members voted in favor, while 31 voted against.⁴⁶

The government responded quickly.⁴⁷ On August 9th, Hinomaru was used at the press conferences of among others the Prime Minister’s Official Residence and the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs. At a cabinet meeting on August 10th Nonaka instructed public offices to hoist the national flag at the opening of new government offices and on public holidays. In addition the Minister of Education Yūuma repeated that the legalization would not change the situation in the schools.⁴⁸

The legalization was strongly controversial. Concerning the question of whether it is necessary to legalize Hinomaru and Kimigayo as the national flag and anthem of Japan, a 1978 opinion poll showed that 43,7 percent considered it necessary, while 48 percent did not find it necessary. In the case of Kimigayo the respective percentage was 43,2 and 48,8.⁴⁹ The 1999 opinion poll conducted in late June while the matter was being discussed in the Diet, showed that 59 percent found it necessary to legalize Hinomaru and 47 percent found it necessary to legalize Kimigayo.⁵⁰ 58 percent said they agreed with the proposal. However only 23 percent thought they should be legalized in August 1999, 66 percent said the question should be thoroughly discussed first.⁵¹

Organizations such as the Network against Hinomaru and Kimigayo and the Japan Congress, which supports the legalization, and numerous other organizations that either support or oppose the legislation have been formed.⁵² The symbols are associated with WW II, but it is mostly because of the lyrics of Kimigayo that praise the Emperor and hope his reign may last forever, that reactions have been strong.

Chapter 2: Nationalism and Patriotism – Confusing terms

It seems the problem connected with Hinomaru and Kimigayo often is a problem of confusing terms. Different people use words such as “return to prewar nationalism” and “the promotion of healthy nationalism or patriotism” to describe the same issue, thus causing confusion.

It should be stressed that few studies of nationalism deal with the case of Japan. As Sandra Wilson writes, “reference to the Japanese case is almost entirely missing from the contemporary theoretical literature on nation and nationalism.”⁵³ Wilson suggests this might be because Japan does not quite conform to the best-known models of nationalism, which have tended to focus on colonies’ struggle for independence or groups within an established nation state fighting for autonomy. It is therefore necessary to look into the problem of how to describe nationalism itself, before focusing on the main topic of this thesis.

Nationalism is a word that often appears in the modern world, and as a term it has been used at least since the eighteenth century.⁵⁴ “Partly because nationalism manifests itself in various guises and partly because the term is used for different purposes, it is an ambiguous concept.”⁵⁵ It has been connected with the rise of nation states and with struggles for national independence. However, its meanings have changed over time, and today it is a term that invites confusion.

In the words of Kemiläinen, “One of the most difficult problems of the study of nationalism is ... the question of what is meant by nationalism.”⁵⁶ Kemiläinen says that in the writing of history nationalism has been used since the 1920s to mean both a theory and a period – the age of nationalism. The word was not frequently used before

the end of the nineteenth century, a statement Kemiläinen bases on the lack of definitions of nationalism in dictionaries and lexicons.⁵⁷

Many writers have dealt with the problem of how to define nationalism, but as Shafer points out, the study of nationalism has not been able to establish an accurate definition.

“students have found flaws and omissions, and for the purposes of their own studies or influenced by their own political philosophies have proceeded to form their own definitions. Clarity has seldom been achieved, scientific study has thus been hindered”.

Shafer argues that a short, scientific definition that would include everything belonging to nationalism might be impossible. However, “if nationalism is to be understood, clearer general understanding of what the word means must be achieved.”⁵⁸

The Encyclopedia Americana’s article on nationalism distinguishes between anticolonial, secessionist, unifying, integrationist, irredentist and exclusive forms of nationalism. Furthermore it is stated:

“Compounding the difficulty of defining nationalism is the fact that the term has been applied to a variety of phenomena that may be related to but are distinct from nationalism: patriotism, chauvinism, xenophobia, racism, and popular sentiment.”⁵⁹

“These concepts are more limited concepts than nationalism or are extreme manifestations of some aspect of the concept.”⁶⁰

A clear distinction is made between patriotism and nationalism, and it is pointed out that nationalism is not simply loyalty to the state, a concept that “is appropriately called patriotism.”⁶¹ However, it is not said when loyalty to the state or patriotism stops being simply loyalty to the state and turns into nationalism, with its more threatening connotations.

When dealing with the issues of Hinomaru and Kimigayo and Japanese nationalism, how to distinguish nationalism from patriotism or so-called “healthy nationalism” becomes an evident and unavoidable question. It might be that it is not possible to make a clear distinction. Though he too does not refer to the case of Japan, Billig in his “Banal Nationalism” pays much attention to the confusion of terms. Thereby he makes an important effort to clarify the concept of nationalism in the modern world.

He criticizes previous studies and definitions of nationalism, not so much because of what they include but because of what they leave out. He argues that former studies focus on nationalism as “hot nationalism” or extremism, and emphasize the gap between “us” and “them”. Furthermore they ignore the so-called healthy nationalism or patriotism of the established democracies of the world. In accordance, he extends the definition of nationalism and includes everyday patriotism, or what is often referred to as healthy nationalism, and speaks of “banal nationalism” or “everyday nationalism”.

Billig points out that in both popular and academic writings, nationalism is associated with those who struggle to create new states or with extreme right-wing politicians.⁶² This means that former President Bush, who headed an international coalition against Iraq or his son, present President Bush, who headed a smaller coalition against Iraq, presented themselves as the representatives of global morality and justice. Accordingly they are often not seen as nationalists, whereas for example Serbian guerrillas were. According to studies of nationalism, which focus on “hot nationalism” or extremism, separatists, fascists and guerrillas are the problems of nationalism, not the leaders of democracies.

Billig continues: “Yet there is something misleading about this accepted use of the word ‘nationalism’. It always seems to locate nationalism on the periphery.”⁶³ This

makes it possible for those who live in the established nations at the center of things to consider nationalism the property of others and to ignore the nationalism of their own nations. Instead it is common – and one might say more comfortable, to use words such as patriotism and loyalty when describing one's own feelings towards one's own country.

Billig states that when dealing with nationalism, academics have tended to ignore what he refers to as “banal nationalism”. While using projecting theories of nationalism, which define nationalism in a limited way and project it onto others, they have often at the same time naturalized the nationalism of the established nations out of existence through the use of naturalizing theories of nationalism. These theories take a world of nation states for granted and consider loyalty to one's own nation to be natural. Banal nationalism is not seen as nationalism, but a lack of patriotism can be seen as a cause for concern,⁶⁴ which in Japan has been the point of view of among others Prime Minister Nakasone.

Studies of nationalism have often considered nationalism as the force that creates nation states and have focused less on what happens to nationalism within an established nation state. Gellner distinguishes between agrarian and industrial societies, and argues that nationalism did not exist in the agrarian societies. It existed mainly in the early stages of industrialization. According to Gellner, nationalism emerges only when the existence of the state “is already very much taken for granted,”⁶⁵ and he believes that nationalism may fade away in more “mature, homogenous” industrial societies. However, he does not “describe what happens to nationalism once the nation-state is established. It is as if nationalism suddenly disappears.”⁶⁶ It only continues to

exist as a threat to the established nation, remote from everyday life. As Billig puts it, the problem is not “what such theories describe as nationalist, but what they omit.”⁶⁷

It is very common to hear both politicians and ordinary citizens speak of patriotism or healthy nationalism. However, the question arises whether it is possible to arrive at an accurate, waterproof way to distinguish these terms from nationalism of a more extreme kind. Patriotism is often seen as natural, necessary and praiseworthy, whereas nationalism is considered a threat. Academics also argue in favor of a distinction between the two, saying that patriotism and nationalism represents two very different states of mind.⁶⁸

However, it seems difficult to distinguish between the different terms so easily, and Billig says that one must extend the common definitions of nationalism and include the so-called patriotism and healthy nationalism. The question must also be asked whether the latter has only positive forces, or whether it might have dangerous aspects as well.

In my native Norway the flagging of everyday nationalism is indeed evident. The children’s parade marching up the Karl Johan street of Oslo to greet the royal family at the balcony of the castle on the 17th of May in memory of the Constitution of 1814, marks the yearly peak of what most Norwegians would probably never refer to as everyday nationalism. Instead the word patriotism would most likely be used. It might very well be the case that such manifestations are not necessarily negative, they might even be positive. However, what is dangerous is to simply ignore everyday nationalism among “us” and project nationalism onto “the others”, assuming that “our patriotism” can never be dangerous, but “their nationalism” is.

In contradiction to the assumption that hatred of others is a motivation for war, Billig refers to Jean Bethke Elshtain’s analysis, in which it is argued that “in the past century

young men have gone to war in their millions motivated not primarily by hatred of the enemy, but by a 'will-to-sacrifice'."⁶⁹

Furthermore, it should be stressed how so-called positive patriotism has been an eager supporter of recent wars. When a nation's interests are at stake in the modern world, whether it is the matter of Great Britain's pride in the Falklands war or US oil interests, as was the case during the Gulf war, it is supported by the population.

The Bush presidents have in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and in connection with the current Iraq question presented the national interests of the US as a new world order that claims to represent morality and justice. Globalization becomes a disguise for national interests, which are often overlooked in such conflicts, where the US appearing as a world police, and claims to speak on behalf of the world.

However, it is important to keep in mind that claims for world justice are not absolute. The US did not lead an international coalition of outrage when Indonesia, a substantial oil producer, annexed East Timor in 1975. Furthermore it is a world that does not include the countries that represent a threat to the national interests of the countries headed by the US, as for example Iraq.

Traditional definitions of nationalism, which do not include everyday nationalism, in fact simply define away the nationalism of the established countries and thereby conflicts such as the Gulf war⁷⁰ - and for that matter the peaceful Norwegian May 17th parade - as subjects of studies of nationalism.

When national interests are at stake, Billig shows that everyday nationalism can be a supporting force behind nationalistic warfare. He does not, however, address sufficiently the issues of whether everyday nationalism and linked national identity can

be something positive, or whether it is possible to find a healthy balance, which seems to be lacking in the discussions concerning the topic of Japanese nationalism.

It seems that the problems connected with the question of Hinomaru and Kimigayo - and the related issues of Yasukuni Jinja and history textbooks to a certain extent are a problem of confusing terms and different perceptions of nationalism. Critics both within Japan and abroad have frequently claimed that the legalization of Hinomaru and Kimigayo as the national flag and the national anthem, the visits of Prime Minister Nakasone in 1985 and of Prime Minister Koizumi in 2001, 2002 and 2003 to the Yasukuni Jinja and the history textbook problem indicate a Japanese return to nationalism.

When saying this, critics often have in mind what is referred to as prewar nationalism, a subject that “is painfully associated with partially unresolved wartime issues”.⁷¹ The promoters of such controversial issues, on the other hand, tend to speak of healthy nationalism. However, it seems that the different sides, while using similar terms, have different things in mind, and that there exist various forms of nationalism. As Cripps has commented concerning the issue of Hinomaru and Kimigayo:

“to see the controversy purely in terms of an argument between nationalists and liberals is unduly simplistic. The conflict is in many respects a dispute between different kinds of nationalism.”⁷²

In the case of Japan it seems to be “a conflict of image and an intellectual row about the attitudes to, and definitions of, what Japan is and what it means to be Japanese.”⁷³ While the campaigns initiated by Japanese Prime Ministers aim at promoting what they see as healthy nationalism or patriotism, critics tend to think of the extreme nationalism

of prewar times. The fact that the opponents have different associations thus makes fruitful discussions difficult.

Chapter 3: The occurrence of “healthy nationalism and internationalism”

In the 1980s a political campaign often referred to by its supporters as “healthy nationalism and internationalism” was promoted to renew Japanese pride and patriotism. At the same time, education policy and education reform became an area of national concern. Education became the arena where, among others, Prime Minister Nakasone set out to promote traditional values.

The policies promoted in the 1980s were more than merely attempts to reform the education system; it seems their aim was to serve as a basis for a way of thinking about Japanese identity. Thus the question must be asked why the supporters of the so-called “healthy nationalism and internationalism” found it necessary to initiate such a political campaign.

Often support of one’s own country in the name of patriotism is taken for granted and a lack of it can be seen as a problem, which seems to be what concerned Nakasone, Prime Minister from 1982 to 1987. Due to the war experiences of the 1930s and 40s, being proud of Japan was a concept with very negative connotations.

Schoppa argues that Nakasone believed many areas “of Japanese politics had become ‘taboo’ due to the nation’s experience of militarism and defeat.” Therefore he set out to review the postwar legacy⁷⁴ and to rid the Japanese system of what he perceived as the influence of the American occupation. He saw such a move as another step towards “settling the accounts of postwar politics⁷⁵” and towards Japan’s emergence as an independent country on the world stage.”⁷⁶ Accordingly the aim of his “grand design” was to get “the Japanese to set aside their ‘postwar complex’ and to see their country as a ‘big power’”.⁷⁷

To justify increasing patriotism because of increasing internationalism he argued:

“Each country has a long history, traditions and culture...its heritage. That is the foundation...It is to love the long history, traditions and culture. On top of this, it is then to use them to contribute to the rest of the world. Without knowing the foundation, you cannot exchange with other countries...It is to plant a flower of Japan in the global garden.”⁷⁸

Furthermore Nakasone said:

“It is important that we unite in peace and culture around the Emperor, that we contribute culturally, politically, and economically to the rest of the world, that we join together with other nations in seriously considering these issues, and that we share our prosperity with the rest of the global community. Yet we cannot do any of this unless we are also confident of our own identity. A nationalism that endeavors to foster self-identity in this sense is a completely justifiable nationalism. And we must teach it through education.”⁷⁹

Thus, “healthy nationalism and internationalism” was a political method used to justify increasing patriotism in society in general, and particularly in the field of education, because of increasing internationalization, making education policy the center of national attention. A Mainichi Shimbun⁸⁰ opinion poll showed that more than half of those asked expressed dissatisfaction with the school situation, but even so, education policy and education reform had not been the major interest of public concern.

Public concern was triggered mainly by two episodes of school violence in February 1983 that received wide attention. In Yokohama some junior and senior high school students were arrested for attacking a group of sleeping homeless people, killing three.⁸¹ Three days later a Tokyo junior high school teacher stabbed one of his students with a knife in order to defend himself from the beating of several of his students.⁸²

The result was an increasing focus on school violence and a feeling of crisis. Conservative forces claimed violence was the result of a lack of moral education in the postwar schools; in order to deal with the moral decline of its youth Japan needed to return to the morals once taught by the Imperial Rescript on Education. However, others linked the violence to “deeper problems in the Japanese education system as a whole”, such as the pressure of examinations.⁸³

“Nakasone had always been interested in changing some aspects of Japan and its society, including elements of the education system.”⁸⁴ Hood argues his aim was not limited to school violence and examination pressure, it seems to have been almost a secondary issue and a means to change aspects of society. “What he appears to have been seeking was a reform of the sort of Japanese person ‘produced’ by the education system, and this would be a stepping stone to a reform of society as a whole.”⁸⁵

However, it should be noted that the public did not necessarily support the conservative forces’ attempts at increasing patriotism. The Mainichi Shimbun⁸⁶ opinion poll mentioned above showed that 69 % said there was no need to promote the idea of protecting one’s country in schools. The public focus was on international peace, maintaining the order of society, and protecting nature, traditions and culture.

In 1967 an attempt to reform the education system was made when Monbushō “made a little-noticed ‘request for advice’ from the Central Council on Education”⁸⁷, Chūkyōshin, an advisory body within Monbushō. Schoppa sees the university crises of the late 1960s as the main reason for the publicity concerning Chūkyōshin. It issued basic guidelines for reform in 1971 and called for flexibility and diversity. Among others it suggested alternatives to the standard 6-3-3-system of six years of elementary school, three years of junior high school and three years of senior high school, and to

establish a system requiring new teachers to undergo a probationary year before being employed.

Nikkyōso, the Japan Teachers' Union, was seen as an opponent of change when it worked against the education reform by participating in bringing together many separate groups under the "People's Coalition for the Promotion of Democratic Education".⁸⁸

Despite the efforts of Chūkyōshin, substantial reform was not achieved.

Nakasone claimed the main reason for the failure of the 1971 reform was that Monbushō had dominated it.⁸⁹ He initiated a second attempt at reform through the establishment of an Ad Hoc Council on Education, Rinkyōshin, an advisory body directly under the control of the Nakasone cabinet.⁹⁰ The Diet was given some supervision, while Monbushō directed the council's secretariat. Mori Yoshirō, a young LDP specialist on education was appointed Education Minister.⁹¹

Many of the members were appointed directly by Nakasone, however his influence should not be exaggerated. In the committee of 1971 there had been no members of Nikkyōso, or a single teacher. A teacher, who was a member of Nikkyōso, was appointed to Rinkyōshin, but her ties to the Ministry seemed more important, because she had worked with the Ministry on a morality project.⁹²

Various forces from the conservative sector made up Rinkyōshin. Asahi Shimbun⁹³ was concerned that the committee, which consisted of elite people, might have problems gaining the support of ordinary people. It worked for three years and published four reports. The success of the council therefore depended on whether the members were able to agree or not.

What made “healthy nationalism and internationalism” controversial?

Before looking into how the so-called “healthy nationalism and internationalism” influenced the field of education through the implementation of the education reform, it is necessary to address the issue of why the so-called “healthy nationalism and internationalism” was controversial in the first place.

According to Nakasone the Japanese system of education created broilers who focused on nothing but the difficult university entrance exams. He stressed the need to teach people to understand and respect their own culture and traditions.⁹⁴ Rinkyōshin adopted the ideology of “healthy nationalism and internationalism” and focused on what was presented as a healthy balance of love for Japan and respect and tolerance towards foreign nations and their cultures.⁹⁵

Consequently it was argued that one cannot profess an internationalist perspective without first possessing a clear sense of identity. The question must be asked why this so-called “healthy nationalism and internationalism” and the education policy with which it was connected, was controversial.

As mentioned when discussing the terms of nationalism and patriotism, terminology is at the root of the problem. Opponents saw the political campaign of “healthy nationalism and internationalism” as a threat and a possible return to prewar nationalism. Supporters considered Nakasone’s way of thinking as the promotion of necessary healthy nationalism or patriotism, allegedly lacking among the younger generations of Japanese. As such it dealt not merely with Japan’s relations with other countries but also with Japanese identity.

The balance between love for Japan and respect and tolerance towards foreign nations was at the core of “healthy nationalism and internationalism”. However, it

seems the wish to strengthen Japan's position in the world and to increase the Japanese people's love for Japan might have been the dominating part of Nakasone and his supporters' philosophy. This resulted in a lack of credibility regarding respect towards foreign nations. In this sense, as the following examples illustrate, lack of credibility became a major reason for the controversy regarding "healthy nationalism and internationalism".

The promotion of "healthy nationalism and internationalism" was accompanied by the emergence of problems concerning history textbooks, which tended to ignore Japanese war crimes on the Korean Peninsula and in China. The incidents caused vehement protests from China, South and North Korea, and resulted in the resignation of Monbushō ministers. The various history textbook incidents were clearly not seen as a token of Japan's tolerance towards other cultures.

Nakasone argued that true independence was not possible as long as Japan depended on the US for its military defense. Consequently he wanted to revise article nine of the constitution, according to which Japan renounces "war as a sovereign right of the nation". He also called for "military appropriations exceeding the 1 per cent of gross national product that had been allocated in the past."⁹⁶ This goal was reached in 1988 when according to some calculations, Japan's expenditures on defense were the world's third highest. Together with the history textbook incidents, this policy of defense was seen as a matter of concern by neighboring countries.

Furthermore, as a part of the campaign to restore "healthy nationalism" Nakasone on the 15th of August 1985, forty years after the end of the war, visited the Yasukuni shrine, where those who have died in the service of the state, are honored. The names of Japanese soldiers, who died in WW II, are engraved there and in 1978 the names of 14

convicted class A war criminals, including Tōjō, were engraved as well. Because of the shrine's strong association with the war, the visits of prime ministers have caused and continue to cause negative reactions both in Japan and in neighboring countries.

Though the visit provoked vehement protests both within Japan and abroad, Hood argues that Nakasone saw it as his duty as a Japanese prime minister to pay respect to the war dead at least once:

“Thank you for all your hardships and pains. Rest assured, we shall build a new Japan as a peaceful state.”⁹⁷

The call for the promotion of traditional values in education and the reassertion of Japanese pride and self-identity in general, coincided with a wave of so-called “Nihonjiron” books in the 1970s and 80s. These books stressed Japan's supposedly unique cultural heritage as a reason for its economic success. A book such as Vogel's “Japan as number one” made it to the top of the best-seller lists. Though it is a book on how to learn from Japan, more copies of it were sold in Japan than in any other country.⁹⁸ In his book “The Myth of Japanese Uniqueness” Dale refers to the “Nihonjinron” as the “commercialized expression of modern Japanese nationalism.”⁹⁹

In a time of increasing internationalization these books were used to define and to exaggerate the so-called uniqueness of Japan to the extent that they tended to ignore the respect of different cultures, supposedly a vital part of the political camping of “healthy nationalism and internationalism”.

In 1986 Nakasone claimed that the reason why Japan's economy was better than the US economy, was that while homogenous Japanese inhabited Japan, in the US there were blacks, Mexicans and Puerto Ricans.¹⁰⁰ This notorious remark had much in

common with the way of thinking often presented by the “Nihonjinron”. It caused commotion both in Japan and abroad and certainly made critics doubt his sincerity, both in respect to statements concerning Yasukuni and his respect for foreign countries. Furthermore it made them place him in line with the theories of the “Nihonjinron”.¹⁰¹

Even though some of Nakasone’s statements are extreme at the best of times, it does seem likely that there is a connection between the militarism of the 1930s and 40s and the lack of emphasis on Japanese culture and traditions in education in postwar Japan. Because of the war experience, more positive aspects of Japanese culture and traditions have to a certain extent been neglected.¹⁰² When talking with young Japanese¹⁰³ one is often left with the impression that there are many things about their country – both positive and negative aspects – that they are not familiar with, which might lead one to think that changes are indeed necessary within education and in society in general.

However, it should be stressed that the main problem regarding “healthy nationalism and internationalism” seems to have been a lack of credibility or trust caused to a large extent by the unfortunate tendency to emphasize positive aspects while the problem of facing war responsibility remained buried and ignored under a mountain of taboos - both in the schools and in society in general.

It would seem that the aim of the conservative forces was to arrive at a clear sense of identity by moving on, while leaving the war behind and avoiding to face up to the problems of the past. Based on this it might be reasonable to argue that the campaign of “healthy nationalism and internationalism”, together with the wave of Nihonjinron books, served to strengthen the problems of the confusing terms of nationalism and patriotism, by avoiding the issues at the core of the question of national consciousness.

Chapter 4: Kimigayo and the imperial institution, the focus of much opposition

Education seems to be the area where the conflict regarding the so-called “healthy nationalism and internationalism” was the strongest. The Ministry of Education, Monbushō and the Japan Teachers’ Union, Nikkyōso were the main opponents struggling over Hinomaru and Kimigayo, the most evident element of the political campaign within the field of education.

At the root of the problem of Hinomaru and particularly Kimigayo are the controversial position of the emperor and the question of whether a national anthem that praises the emperor’s reign is acceptable in a country, whose Constitution states that the emperor is a symbol of the state and of the unity of the people¹⁰⁴

Before addressing the question how the politics of so-called “healthy nationalism and internationalism” influenced the field of education, it is necessary to understand the symbols’ role in Japanese society in general and in the field of education in particular. Thus it is necessary to look at the historical context. The position of the emperor is at the root of the issue of Kimigayo. To get a clear understanding of the basis on which much opposition within the field of education is based, it is necessary to look into the establishment of this system, its influence on the field of education and the question of the emperor’s war responsibility.

The history of Hinomaru and Kimigayo

Kimigayo and Hinomaru have been used for a long time as the national anthem and flag of Japan. Based on a law of habit, they have often been referred to as such. When looking for Hinomaru and Kimigayo in the Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan, the encyclopedia instead refers to articles on the national flag and anthem,¹⁰⁵ even though neither of them has officially been recognized as such by law.

Hinomaru

Hinomaru is said to symbolize the sun. Its name literally means “the circle of the sun”. It is not certain when it was used for the first time. Scholars are divided in their views on the historical background of both symbols,¹⁰⁶ but some say it dates back to as early as the eighth century. It has also been said that it was used during the Mongol invasions of Japan in the 13th century.¹⁰⁷

The use of the flag in its current form dates back more than three hundred years. Toyotomi Hideyoshi used the flag in his invasions of Korea in 1592 and 1597. The ships of the Tokugawa shogunate also adopted it in the early seventeenth century.¹⁰⁸ In the latter days of national isolation (1639-1854) in the Tokugawa period (1603-1868), when trade and other contact with foreign countries increased, Shimazu Nariakira, the 28th Lord of Satsuma domain, suggested that the flag should be used not only by the shogunate’s ships but also by all Japanese ships, in order to distinguish them from foreign ships.


At first the shogunate rejected the proposal, but later, based on Nariakira's suggestion, it decided that all Japanese ships should use the flag. The first ship that used Hinomaru to distinguish it as a Japanese ship was Shōheimaru of Satsuma in 1855.¹⁰⁹

The Meiji Government was established in 1868. On January 27th and October 3rd 1870 the Grand Council of the State issued Proclamations No. 57 and No. 6, which formally decided that Hinomaru should be used on Japanese merchant ships and on naval vessels.¹¹⁰

Based on these proclamations Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan in its 1983 article on the national flag claims "It was not until 27 January 1870, however, that the new Meiji government officially designated it as the national flag of Japan". It does not say that the proclamations only concerned merchant ships and the navy. Thus the encyclopedia misinterprets the historical facts, and as such, it is a statement that shows to what extent the legal status of Hinomaru has been taken for granted.

In 1871 the Grand Council was reorganized; in 1885 a cabinet replaced it and its declarations were abolished.¹¹¹ In 1931 a member of the Lower House suggested to legalize Hinomaru as the national flag, but the House of Peers rejected the bill.¹¹²

Though Hinomaru is associated with the war, it should be kept in mind that the use of the flag today and during and before the war in some cases is quite different. It was not the white and red rising sun flag (the flag to the right below), but the one that also includes sun's rays that was used by the navy (the flag to the left below).



When it comes to the display of Hinomaru at entrance and graduation ceremonies, before the war the flag was hung at the front gate, while today in most cases it is used inside the school hall.¹¹³

Kimigayo

Though the lyrics of Kimigayo are very old, as a song in its present form, it dates from 1880 and is closely associated with the emperor. It is unknown who wrote the lyrics. It appears in the 10th century anthology *Kokin wakashu*, a collection of classical 31-syllable waka poem. The original first line referred only to “My Lord” (Waga kimi wa). However in the 11th century anthology *Wakan rôeishu* it had changed to “My Lord’s Reign” (Kimi ga yo)¹¹⁴, which has been taken to mean the emperor. Before 1945 this was the meaning taught in schools.¹¹⁵

In 1869 the British military band instructor Fenton asked whether Japan had a ceremonial national anthem. He offered to compose the music if somebody could provide the lyrics. Satsuma had played an important role in the Meiji restoration and Japan’s first military band was established by Satsuma domain in 1870. Their director Ōyama Iwao,¹¹⁶ who was himself from Satsuma, chose Kimigayo from *Hôraisan*, a *Satsuma-biwauta* (lute- song). Fenton composed the music, which was played for the

first time during an army parade on September 18th, 1870 by the Satsuma military band, which had studied music in Yokohama under the guidance of Fenton.¹¹⁷

In 1876 it was proposed to rewrite the music of Kimigayo and to compose music that reflected the style of the musical chants performed at the imperial court. The task was entrusted to the Imperial Household Ministry.¹¹⁸ In 1880 among others Hayashi Hiromori and the German composer Eckert were appointed to compose a new melody.¹¹⁹ Hayashi wrote the melody that is today known as Hinomaru and Eckert brought the music into consonance.¹²⁰ It was performed for the first time at the emperor's birthday on November 3rd, 1880 at the imperial palace.¹²¹

Furthermore, in 1891 the elementary school rules for national holidays and festival days listed Kimigayo as an appropriate song to use on such days.¹²² The rules established the worship of the portrait of the emperor and the reverent reading of the imperial rescript on education.¹²³ Finally in 1893 Kimigayo was included as one of the songs to be sung on such special days.¹²⁴ Thus Kimigayo became closely linked not only with schools but was also associated with the emperor and values such as loyalty and patriotism.¹²⁵

Though the China and Russia wars (1894-95 and 1904-05) strengthened the position of Kimigayo, there was also criticism against it. Osaka Asahi Shinbun said in 1904 that it was the imperial family's song, not a state song.¹²⁶ However, as state control of schools and society in general became strong during the 1930s and 40s, Kimigayo came to be treated as the national anthem, though the only time it was actually referred to as such was in a textbook on ethics in 1937.¹²⁷

Thus Kimigayo and Hinomaru have been used for a long time as the national anthem and flag of Japan. Most countries have written laws¹²⁸ specifying their national

flag and anthem, but in Japan both have been a matter of habit. There has been no additional law until the symbols were hastily acknowledged as the national flag and anthem by the Diet on the 9th of August 1999.

For some people the symbols are associated with World War II. In 2000, 35 percent answered that they sympathize with people who oppose Hinomaru and Kimigayo because they made them think of the war and the prewar period. 56 percent said that they did not.¹²⁹ It is mostly because of the lyrics of Kimigayo that opposition remains strong. This was also confirmed by a 1978 opinion poll, when 65,2 percent of those who did not find Kimigayo appropriate as “the national anthem”, said the lyrics are not appropriate.

The imperial institution and the process of creating a national identity

The position of the emperor is at the root of the issue of Kimigayo. Today, the imperial institution is the symbol of modern Japan based on its democratic constitution of 1947.

Though the lyrics that praise the emperor and hope his reign will last forever are very old, as a national symbol, Kimigayo is closely associated with the imperial institution and dates from the Meiji period (1868-1912). Based on the Constitution of 1889, which had the imperial institution at its center, the Meiji period represented a political system that had contradictory elements of both constitutional and absolute monarchy. At the core of the problem of Kimigayo is therefore the system the imperial institution represented.

Prior to the Restoration in 1868 the role of the Japanese emperor had been vague. As Sandra Wilson explains, the

“nationalism of the mid-nineteenth century,...though crucial to the overthrow of the Tokugawa regime and the establishment of the Meiji nation-state, was by and large the nationalism of a small elite.” As such “it was greatly overshadowed at that time by more local loyalties – to villages or to domains, rather than to any 'national entity'”.¹³⁰

After the Meiji Restoration, the political leaders of Japan faced two rather contradictory tasks. “One was the legitimation of political rule by strengthening the imperial institution; the other was rapid Westernization to ensure national independence.”¹³¹

National identity had yet to be created and implanted among the people. In this process the institution of the emperor was useful. During the Meiji era the emperor became the ideological center of the Japanese nation and it was therefore necessary to make him familiar to the population. The political leaders set out to make the emperor known as the central institution of government, a process in many ways completed by the time of the promulgation of the constitution.¹³² When Emperor Meiji died in 1912, the role of the emperor was surrounded by an aura of symbols that “held its power through to the end of the Second World War.”¹³³

"The institution of the emperor constituted the main pillar of the Meiji political system. It was the single most effective instrument employed by the ruling elite to retain their authority. The transformation of the imperial court from an empty institution, virtually unknown to the masses during the Tokugawa era, into an institution that claimed unquestioned, absolute sovereignty was one of the key achievements of the Meiji leaders."¹³⁴

During the Tokugawa era, the people knew the shogunate, but their knowledge of the existence of the emperor was vague.¹³⁵ He was sent on travels to make his people acquainted with him. While the Tokugawa emperors (1603-1868) made only 3 travels, from 1868 to 1912 Emperor Meiji made 102 travels, of which 70 took place before the promulgation of the constitution.¹³⁶

Though it was written by, among others, Itō Hirobumi¹³⁷, the constitution, was promulgated as the gift of the emperor in 1889.¹³⁸ It came into force on November 11th 1890.¹³⁹ Among the oligarch leaders there was a general distrust towards political parties and it was feared that the imperial institution would fall under the control of the politicians.

In a famous speech in 1888 Itō defended the imperial institution as the axis of the nation against the power of the party politicians.¹⁴⁰ However, Itō said contradictory things regarding the aim of the constitution.¹⁴¹ It therefore seems reasonable to argue that

"The Meiji Constitution was essentially an attempt to unite two concepts which...were irreconcilable: Imperial absolutism and popular government."¹⁴²

The first paragraph spoke of the imperial house as a "line unbroken for ages eternal" and placed the emperor at its core.¹⁴³ He was the sovereign of the nation and the descendant of the Sun Goddess;¹⁴⁴ a principle agreed upon even by those whose point of view of politics was a secular one.¹⁴⁵ The constitution stated that it was established by the emperor; he was the only one who could change it. It was a code of laws that would be in effect forever. It was not changed once as long as it existed.¹⁴⁶

The constitution had elements of constitutional and absolute monarchy. It contained major contradictions and has been described as apparent constitutionalism.¹⁴⁷ A feature of constitutional monarchy was the existence of the Imperial Parliament. However, the government was responsible to the emperor and the important advisory organ the Privy Council was appointed by the emperor.

The army and navy ministers were responsible directly to the emperor, not the Prime Minister.¹⁴⁸ Both the emperor and the House of Peers had the power to veto the Lower House, which though its influence was limited, had to approve tax bills. As the armed forces demanded more money, the opposition exercised some power when the governments turned to it for money through taxes.

After the promulgation the emperor became a figure remote from the people. In the early years, he traveled to be seen. Where the crowds used to wait to see him, they were now kept away and public appearance was limited to events such as military parades.¹⁴⁹ In 1888 he was photographed¹⁵⁰ and his portrait was used in schools, public buildings and on money. His image "replaced his person before the public",¹⁵¹ and he was "more fully public property than he had ever been before."¹⁵²

The imperial institution and the education system

In Meiji efforts were made to create and implant a feeling of national identity to strengthen the state. The imperial institution was an important tool in this process, which was also evident within the pre-war education system and which has formed the basis for protests against government control of education in postwar Japan. In the Meiji period Japan's progress was linked to the emperor and emphasized in schools. But, it was not until the "severe and rigid ideological control of the 1930s"¹⁵³ that the state was able to control fully the teachers.

Education policy in early Meiji went through several changes, which is hardly surprising considering the rather conflicting goals of strengthening the emperor to legitimize political rule, and westernizing the country to maintain its independence. After years of catching up with the West a reaction set in. The government embarked on the control of education in order to suppress liberal movements.¹⁵⁴ Motoda Eifu, a palace official and Confucian tutor to the Emperor, criticized the extreme western focus and emphasized the need to focus on the emperor as the source of moral authority, the ancestral imperial tradition and Confucian morality with loyal and filial subjects at its core.¹⁵⁵

The instructions on education in 1879 made ethics, the least important subject, the core.¹⁵⁶ However, the revival of Confucianism was criticized by among others Fukuzawa Yukichi and Mori Arinori. When the latter became Minister of Education in 1885, he aimed at a Western-style education system.¹⁵⁷

In 1890 a Governor Conference on education argued that knowledge had been promoted at the expense of moral education.¹⁵⁸ It also criticized the involvement of youth in politics, probably the real reason for concern. Prime Minister Yamagata ordered Monbushō to draw up a statement defining the basic aims of education.¹⁵⁹ The imperial rescript on education was the

result of cooperation between, among others, Motoda Eifu and Inoue Kowashi, and was promulgated on October 30th 1890.¹⁶⁰ It was seen by the postwar US occupation rule as a tool of imperialism.

It stated that the source of the “*kokutai*”, Japan’s unique national polity, and of education was the relationship between Amaterasu and the other imperial ancestors, who established Japan, and the subjects.¹⁶¹ The subjects were asked to cultivate virtues, such as *chū*, loyalty, and *kō*, filial piety. In addition the rescript pointed at the importance of respecting the Constitution and laws, values of a modern state. “At the same time, by presenting the principles of education as eternal truths, it pretends to be an apolitical document.”¹⁶²

Education policy had settled “in one word, on our *kokutai*”,¹⁶³ which refers directly to the imperial dynasty as the center of the Japanese state and to a fictive bond between the people and the emperor as the father of the people. At the time Confucianism was associated with the feudal past and therefore had negative connotations. Therefore Inoue minimized the Confucian connection. The word itself did not appear in the rescript and its virtues were welcomed as the Japanese way.¹⁶⁴

Monbushō selected the distinguished ideologue Inoue Tetsujirō to write a comment on the rescript for use in schools. Though the word patriotism did not appear in the rescript, Inoue “linked Confucian virtues with ‘collective patriotism,’ thus making patriotism...the sum meaning of the moral text.”¹⁶⁵

Ueno Chizuko argues that the order of the Confucian virtues *chū* and *kō* was turned upside down in the Meiji period to strengthen the position of the emperor.¹⁶⁶ Traditionally *kō*, filial piety towards the parents was more important than *chū*, loyalty towards a feudal lord. Thus the possibility of conflict existed.¹⁶⁷ However, in Inoue’s 1891 “Interpretation of the Rescript” and his 1908 “Ethics and Education” it is claimed that *chū* and *kō* are the same, and loyalty towards the emperor is stressed at the expense of filial piety.¹⁶⁸

“If the spirit, which expresses filial piety to the head of the family is extended to the whole nation, this is exactly the same as loyalty towards the emperor.”¹⁶⁹

Since the emperor is the head of the Japanese people, one must exercise *chū* towards the emperor in the same manner, as it is one’s duty to exercise *chū* towards the head of the family.¹⁷⁰ To Ueno this is a trick achieved during the establishing process of the rescript.

Throughout the 1890s and the 1900s Monbushō worked to establish control. It was easier to include the rescript in school ceremonies than in the curriculum.¹⁷¹ Ideologically unreliable teachers were a problem. In 1908 only 26 percent of teachers were graduates of the strict training of national teacher schools.¹⁷² The efficiency of the rescript and to what extent the pupils –and the teachers – understood it should be questioned. In 1912 a journalist wrote,

”though the Rescript on Education is known and memorized throughout the country, it is only mouthed. Even the educators recite it like a sutra without understanding its meaning.”¹⁷³

The most dramatic increase in imperial exposure occurred during the two Meiji wars.¹⁷⁴ The media stressed the emperor’s role as the Commander-in-Chief, while he in peacetime disappeared from the headlines.¹⁷⁵

Monbushō struggled to establish control with limited success. It was said, “schools at the end of the Meiji period were places of instruction, not indoctrination.”¹⁷⁶ The situation continued to be quite liberal in the 1910s and 20s. It was not until the 30s the state “was able to suppress the diverse intellectual and political enthusiasms of its teachers”¹⁷⁷ and control became more complete.

In the 30s schools stressed loyalty to the emperor and defense of the nation as important ideals. Until the outbreak of and during World War II education became gradually more militaristic and jingoistic.¹⁷⁸ This formed the basis for the postwar struggle regarding the emperor symbolism with Kimigayo, as an expression of the teacher unions’ strong resistance towards government control of the field of education.

The imperial institution and the question of war responsibility

The imperial institution was caught in a position where major groups of power could manipulate it. However, the war was fought in its name, which became an important reason for the controversy regarding the emperor's war responsibility – and Kimigayo.

Critics of the Shwōa emperor such as Bergamini, Inoue and Bix see the emperor as an absolute monarch. While ignoring the restraints on the emperor's influence that the different forces of power could constitute, Bix¹⁷⁹ holds him responsible for Japan's warfare. Large, however, emphasizes that the emperor saw himself as a constitutional monarch. Contradictory concepts of absolute and limited monarchy in the constitution, contributed to a situation where the emperor

“was an absolute monarch to the people, but within the ruling class he was treated in terms of tacit understanding...that he was a constitutional monarch.”¹⁸⁰

Critics see a 1929 incident, when the government stepped down as the result of the emperor's criticism, and the emperor's opposition to a 1936 military coup attempt as proof of the emperor's influence, and argue that he could have prevented the war.

When Japanese officers murdered the warlord of Manchuria in 1936,¹⁸¹ the emperor wanted a military trial.¹⁸² However, the army resisted and put pressure on Prime Minister Tanaka, who gave in. When reporting to the emperor, he “interpreted the Emperor's words as meaning he should resign.”¹⁸³ Large argues the emperor felt he overstepped the limits of a constitutional monarch and that this influenced the emperor to put restraints on himself.¹⁸⁴

“This form of ‘internal constraint’... would not itself prove decisive in enabling the military to have their own way in early Shōwa Japan. Yet there is no doubt that the self-induced neutrality of the court contributed to the weakening of the resistance to the military.”¹⁸⁵

Prior to the 1936 coup attempt the armed forces gradually became more influential. Minobe, a leading expert on law was criticized for his Organ Theory, published almost thirty

years earlier. It saw the emperor as an organ within the state, not above it.¹⁸⁶ Radical militarist preferred

“an absolutist interpretation that would permit them to exercise power on behalf of the Emperor, whom they claimed to represent directly under the provision of the
”independence of the supreme command.”¹⁸⁷

The incident meant the end of freedom of thought¹⁸⁸ and strengthened rivalry within the army¹⁸⁹ between *Kōdō-ha* consisting of younger officers and *Tōsei-ha*, a group headed by generals. *Kōdō-ha* officers staged a coup in 1936.¹⁹⁰ Their success depended on whether the army leaders would support them. Before hesitating generals made up their mind, the emperor ordered the crushing of the coup.¹⁹¹

To Inoue Kiyoshi the incident showed that if the emperor wanted to control the army, he could. Thus he should have been able to prevent the war. The reason why he did not, according to Inoue, was because he did not disagree with the army.¹⁹² However, the emperor did not crush the coup on his own. What became decisive was that he made it clear he was against the coup. The emperor later stated he had overstepped his bounds as a constitutional monarch.¹⁹³

Ironically, the coup meant a strengthening of the military. Many *Kōdō-ha* officers were removed.¹⁹⁴ The power of *Tōsei-ha* after the coup was much stronger than the power of *Kōdō-ha* had been. Its “threat to the constitutional order was more severe since its activities appeared legal...”¹⁹⁵ By trying to use the constitution’s theory regarding an absolute monarch in order to carry out its own policy, *Tōsei-ha* was a threat to the constitution.¹⁹⁶

It seems the emperor had two alternatives.¹⁹⁷ He could defend the constitutional monarchy by overstepping his role. This could cause military resistance and the end of constitutional monarchy. The second option was to act as a constitutional monarch and approve of politics and laws. However, he would risk playing into the hands of those who wanted to subdue the constitutional monarchy by claiming to act on behalf of an absolute monarch.

The emperor chose the second option,¹⁹⁸ for which he has been much criticized. Large critics the emperor for being too passive after the coup but suggests the emperor's belief in his role as a constitutional monarch was decisive.¹⁹⁹

During the war the emperor encouraged Prime Minister Tōjō Hideki, to end it if possible.²⁰⁰ However, the question of whether he delayed the surrender is debatable.²⁰¹ After the atomic bombings, on the request of the Prime Minister, the emperor intervened to make army leaders surrender.²⁰²

Critics say that if the emperor could take part in ending the war, he should have been able to prevent it. However, the situation was different in 1945. The armed forces were much weaker and the economy had collapsed. Though the emperor supported the negotiations with the US in order to try to avoid war, his influence was limited because of his isolated position.²⁰³ It was the government, not the emperor that decided upon war,²⁰⁴ and though he, like many others, both within Japan and in the US - is to blame for not doing more, it seems unlikely he in could have prevented the war in 1941.

The International Military Tribunal for the Far East held a few leaders responsible. However, not only the military but also the vast majority of the population was “completely behind the decision for war”²⁰⁵ and media and members of parliament supported war.

“In so far as the Diet members speak at all, they are so belligerent that the government appears moderate by comparison.”²⁰⁶

By 1941, the Japanese population had become a “war-minded people who believed in the justice of their cause”.²⁰⁷ It seemed the effects of official brainwashing were now visible, affecting the leaders as well as the population, and that it would be very hard for the leaders to avoid a war;

“the people would never have permitted them to accept a de facto defeat by agreeing to the terms that had been submitted by the United States. They had become the slaves of their own creation.”²⁰⁸

With principles of democracy in mind Japan has often been judged for waging an aggressive war. However, it should be kept in mind that Japan after the forced opening of the country, acquired as much knowledge as it could and then set out to establish colonies of its own, as the colonial powers had already done. Thus, “in addressing the question of the emperor's war responsibility, one must distinguish between legalistic assumption in the postwar West and emperor's responsibilities in prewar Japan.”²⁰⁹

After the war Japan and the emperor have been exposed to vehement criticism concerning Japanese warfare and the inhuman war crimes caused by Japanese troops in the areas they occupied. It is impossible to defend or even explain the war crimes, however, the question should be asked whether it is too simplistic to condemn the war itself as an aggressive war of nationalistic imperialism.

It seems the view of history normally presented is the view of the victorious side, influenced by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE). Though the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform, which published a history textbook leaving out negative aspects, questioned this view of history in an extreme way, the issue seems to be avoided by more moderate circles. It might be out of fear that criticism would be linked to prewar ultra- nationalism, that moderates tend to avoid the issue. In the case of the emperor's responsibility it is a crucial question. Much criticism of the emperor, also in Japan, is based on the US view of history, which seems to be too simplistic.²¹⁰

The history taught to US pupils and often conveyed through Hollywood films, normally stresses the “surprise attack” on Pearl Harbor. Though the war itself was not a surprise and the relationship between Japan and the US gradually changed to negative feelings, a survey of US college world history texts concluded that some of the texts

“totally blamed Japanese ‘aggression’ for World War II. They ignored the problems that Japan faced in the 1930s and the role that the West in general and the United States in particular played in creating them. The statements about Japanese ‘aggression’ supplemented by Pearl Harbor pictures usually ignored such things as the Triple Intervention, Wilson’s veto of the Racial Equality Clause at Versailles, the tariff disputes, and the 5-5-3 disarmament problem.”²¹¹

The question of guilt is more complex than is often acknowledged by critics, who claim the IMTFE should have charged the emperor. Had he been charged, he would most likely have been convicted, the presumption was of guilt, not innocence.²¹²

Both the charter of the Tokyo and the Nuremberg trials were based on a 1945 London conference, charging the leaders of Germany and Japan “not simply with conventional war crimes, but crimes against peace and against humanity”²¹³ and for launching a war of aggression.

The problem was that international law was not clear. The London conference record was “a fascinating document, for the Allies found it very difficult to agree even among themselves as to what constituted international law”.²¹⁴ They proposed to prosecute actions they themselves conceded were not crimes under international law.²¹⁵ Accordingly the prosecution was freed “from the necessity of demonstrating that questionable acts were in fact violations of established law.”²¹⁶

The IMTFE only dealt with Japanese war crimes.²¹⁷ Minear see the atomic bombs as examples of “crimes against humanity” and Soviet Union's declaration of war against Japan despite the existence of a neutrality pact, as an example of “crime against peace”. One definition for the Allies and one for Japan “may be good politics; but they are bad justice. Either all are guilty, or none.”²¹⁸

The tribunal dealt with the issue of negative criminality or the disregard of the “legal duty to take adequate steps...to prevent breaches”²¹⁹ of laws of war. Minear discusses whether such a crime existed before international law, but morally the question whether the emperor is accountable for acts of omission in failing to prevent the war is important. Could he have done more? As Large says, “this question is as difficult to answer as it is necessary to ask.”²²⁰

“Hirohito was clearly no pacifist. Rather, he was a nationalist determined to preserve the empire he had inherited, and when Japan went to war, he naturally did everything he could to make sure that it would prevail.”²²¹

Though it seems unlikely the emperor could have prevented the war in 1941, “in the view of the terrible consequences of the war fought in his name”²²² he is to blame for not making more efforts.

Whether the emperor should have stepped down is a difficult question. It seems the emperor remaining has had serious consequences. The emperor not being tried as a war criminal has to a certain extent “permitted the Japanese people to escape their own historical accountability for war.”²²³ Since the war was fought in the name of the emperor, his moral responsibility is beyond question to many Japanese, contributing to the controversy regarding the imperial institution and Kimigayo. To some the

“question has been subsumed into the more basic and complex issue of whether the Japanese people as a whole were also historically responsible for war.”²²⁴ “Many Japanese...came to feel that because the emperor had not been held responsible, neither should they.”²²⁵

As a result there has been no balanced discussion where it was possible to be both self-critical and critical of the view of history and the settling of the guilt issue presented by the US and the IMTFE. The emperor remaining made it easier to ignore the war and to bury it under a mountain of taboos, where conservatives could ignore it. Accordingly this is the basis for much of the controversy both in society in general and within the postwar field of education concerning the political campaign of so-called “healthy nationalism and internationalism”.

Chapter 5: “Healthy nationalism and internationalism” and its influence on education: Monbushō and Nikkyōso

It seems it was within the field of education the struggle regarding the occurrence of so-called “healthy nationalism and internationalism” was strongest, with the controversy of Hinomaru and Kimigayo as the most evident problem. As Yoshino Kosaku puts it, “Education is one of the social areas in which conflicts between the restraints on nationalism and reactions against such restraints have been particularly evident.”²²⁶

Scholars do not agree who is responsible for the fact that the political ideology concerning “healthy nationalism and internationalism” became one of the key areas of the debate on education reform.²²⁷ To Hood, a supporter of Nakasone, this is clearly Nakasone’s “achievement”, while Schoppa²²⁸ credits the somewhat doubtful honor to Monbushō and the LDP education *zoku*.²²⁹

Hood and Schoppa do not agree on the success of Rinkyōshin at implementing its suggestions. Schoppa sees Rinkyōshin as even less successful than the 1971 attempt. He says that in 1971 the reformers were “able to at least put together a substantive reform package – failing mostly in the implementation stage – the Ad Hoc Council did not even get that far”,²³⁰ because they simply could not agree. Hood argues that this conclusion is premature: “In terms of achieving long-term goals for the education reform and social reform, I do not think that things could have worked out better for Nakasone.”²³¹

What remains a fact is that the politics of “healthy nationalism and internationalism” was an area where the conservative forces were mainly in agreement, thus increasing the chances for its implementation. Whether the Ministry or the education *zoku* should take the credit – or the blame – rather than Nakasone, for making it a key area in the debate on education reform is hard to determine. However, it cannot be denied that this is a way of thinking that has been strongly promoted by and connected with Nakasone.

“Nakasone’s contribution was to make ...[issues of education] the focus of national political discourse by making education reform, for the first time, a major plank of the LDP’s political and electoral strategy.”²³²

In connection with the establishment of Rinkyōshin Nakasone stated that the goal of the education reform was to revise the postwar education system and to create “international Japanese”.²³³ Rinkyōshin adopted Nakasone’s view concerning “healthy nationalism and internationalism”, which its 1987 report showed:

“From now it is necessary that our country [Japan] while having a deep understanding, respect and affection for Japanese culture as well as having an extensive understanding of and being tolerant toward other cultures, at the same time as playing a positive, international role, strives to achieve international trust... Together with education that deeply recognizes that a good world citizen is a good Japanese and raises a heart that loves [Japan], education that deepens the understanding of all foreign countries’ culture, traditions etc. must be established.”²³⁴

The emperor served as a tool within this process in order to restore Japanese pride. “Nakasone sought to stimulate popular support for his ‘grand design’ by stressing the importance of the monarchy to the people.”²³⁵ Nakasone clearly linked Hinomaru and Kimigayo to the emperor when he stated in 1987:

“The emperor is something like the sun shining in the heavens. That is why there is respect for Japan. Centered on the emperor Japan contributes to the world. Therefore we must teach these national traditions through education. That is why we have such national symbols as the national flag and the national anthem.”²³⁶

Based on the Rinkyōshin reports the education guidelines were revised in 1989,²³⁷ making use of the symbols at entrance and graduation ceremonies compulsory as in “must be done”, instead of merely “desirable”.²³⁸ This indicates that also the Ministry embraced Nakasone’s view, and it shows that the campaign of so-called “healthy nationalism and internationalism” clearly had an impact on education politics.

The phrase to “raise a heart that loves the country”, other phrases stressing love for Japan and words such as ‘*kokusaika*’ or ‘internationalization’ have become integrated parts of the guidelines. Furthermore, the wordings used by politicians such as Nakasone, stressing that in

order to respect other countries and be international, it is first necessary to love one's own country, have become a part of the guidelines and tend to be used when discussing the topic of Hinomaru and Kimigayo.²³⁹

Though the attention regarding the symbols of Hinomaru and Kimigayo intensified as a result of the politics promoted in the mid-80s, it should be noted that the issue had been addressed several times since the end of the war. After the war Hinomaru was forbidden²⁴⁰ but not Kimigayo.²⁴¹ The ban was lifted in 1949. It had not been total; if individuals applied for permission it was sometimes granted, as was also the case regarding public holidays.²⁴² In the still occupied Okinawa Hinomaru was allowed from January 1953.²⁴³ Around this time NHK started to play Kimigayo and display Hinomaru at the end of programs, and the symbols were used at professional baseball games and at sumō tournaments.²⁴⁴

It is interesting to note that an Asahi Shimbun opinion poll, conducted after the ban was lifted, showed that even though as many as 73 percent of the household asked still possessed the flag, – during the war the hoisting had been compulsory- less than 20 percent hoisted Hinomaru on public holidays. Rather than opposition towards the flag, indifference seemed to be the reason.²⁴⁵

In 1950 Monbushō minister Amano stated that the use of Hinomaru and Kimigayo on public holidays was desirable.²⁴⁶ In 1958 Monbushō for the first time included the use of Hinomaru and Kimigayo in a revision of its guidelines:

“On national holidays and on ceremonial occasions etc, as well as enabling children to understand their significance, it is desirable to hoist the national flag and to sing Kimigayo.”²⁴⁷

Only Hinomaru was referred to as the national flag, while Kimigayo simply remained Kimigayo. Though Monbushō admitted there was no legal base for using the terms national flag and anthem, there was no major counterattack. Senda suggests Nikkyōso, caught up in the struggle against the renewal of the US Japan Security Treaty, did not recognize the

problem as a major one yet.²⁴⁸ The struggle to prevent the conservative forces' efforts to increase patriotism was focused on school subjects.²⁴⁹ However, from the mid 1970s the focus on Hinomaru and Kimigayo became stronger, as attempts to increase patriotism intensified.

In 1974 Prime Minister Tanaka suggested not only to legalize Hinomaru and Kimigayo,²⁵⁰ but also to revive the imperial rescript on education.²⁵¹ The 1977 Monbushō guidelines for the first time referred to Kimigayo as the national anthem,²⁵² but what really caused “turmoil among educators”²⁵³ was the instructions issued by Monbushō in 1985 to all school heads to hoist the national flag and make the children sing the national anthem. Thus the 1989 guidelines, which finally made use of Hinomaru and Kimigayo at entrance and graduation ceremonies mandatory, was the result of a long process.

The success of Ministry guidelines always depends on the response they encounter in the schools, where the teachers had a history of persistently trying to sabotage the authorities' initiatives. The Hinomaru and Kimigayo issue was particularly important in the struggle between Monbushō and Nikkyōsō,²⁵⁴ which was – at least at the national level – one of the strongest conflicts in postwar Japan.

Education politics in postwar Japan were about more than simply education politics. They were a conflict between left and right in Japanese politics, where the field of education functioned as a battlefield for politics in general:

“Since *Nikkyōsō* has been the main force blocking LDP effort to re-establish pre-war patterns and reintroduce traditional Japanese values, it has naturally become a corollary of these policies that the union must first be weakened. Over the years, however, the suppression of the union has also become a goal in itself.”²⁵⁵

Consequently, when discussing how the politics of so-called “healthy nationalism and internationalism” influenced the field of education, one cannot avoid to place the Hinomaru and Kimigayo conflict within the context of the Monbushō vs. Nikkyōsō struggle. Thus, it is necessary to discuss the education politics as a part of what seems to have been LDP's permanent anti-union campaign and to ask to what extent the influence of the so-called

“healthy nationalism and internationalism” depended on this campaign. It might be that in order to increase what was presented as “patriotism” or “healthy nationalism”, a necessary pre-condition was to deal with Nikkyōso.

The effects of anti-union politics

What were the authorities’ policies towards the union? It seems the education policy chosen by the authorities in the first postwar decades was based on a ‘smash the union’²⁵⁶ strategy, which encouraged Nikkyōso to fight harder. When the US occupation ended in 1952, education became a key battleground in the conservative campaign to overturn occupation reforms.²⁵⁷

“In the process of resisting the reverse course, Nikkyōso came to involve itself in the wider struggle that was going on between the conservative government and its progressive opposition.”²⁵⁸ This seems to have been the source of the anti-union element of LDP education policy. The period from 1952 to the early 1960s was a time with strong confrontations, such as the US Japan Security Treaty.

The struggles involved hundreds of mass demonstrations and riots and earned Nikkyōso the bitter enmity of the government. Appealing to the people’s desire for peace, however, the struggles had broader support from the general public. However, the political struggles were often far from the lives of ordinary members. This resulted in a gap between leaders and members.²⁵⁹

Immediately after the war, the political climate had been favorable for the left-wing unions. Major changes took place within the field of education. To decentralize the education system and weaken Monbushō control the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) carried out extensive reforms.²⁶⁰ History, geography and *shūshin* were abolished in 1945. The Far East Committee forbade the use of the imperial rescript on education, but it took more than

one year before the Parliament decided to invalidate the rescript. Thus two pillars of pre-war education disappeared from the educational stage.²⁶¹

In addition books were changed, references to Shinto forbidden, Monbushō power reduced through the public election of school boards, and schools could freely choose textbooks. As noted, the use of Hinomaru, but not of Kimigayo, was forbidden. Furthermore, the Fundamental Law on Education, based on democratic values, was passed in 1947.²⁶² However, it is interesting to note that the general interest in the law was low because of more everyday life problems such as starvation and the general confusion after the war. The teachers' union, founded in 1945, also focused on the need to improve the living conditions of the teachers. Many Marxists teachers were critical of the law because of its US connotations and saw it as the democracy of the bourgeois. They argued that it would not lead to social revolution.²⁶³

Nikkyōso was formed in 1947²⁶⁴ when two teachers' unions, a radical one with communists and quite radical socialists among its members, another more moderate one with less radical socialists as members, joined forces as a result of the occupation force's change of policy due to the Cold War and the Korean War.²⁶⁵ It was estimated that by the autumn of 1947, 446 000, or 98 percent of the elementary school teachers had joined it.²⁶⁶

However, the situation was paradoxical with radical leaders, but mainly moderate members. A reason why teachers in a desperate economic situation²⁶⁷ chose to follow such leaders was in the words of Thurston:

“Psychologically shattered by the total failure of the prewar Emperor-centered ideology, these ordinary teachers were disillusioned with the militaristic government and those forces in the society which had misled the country into the disastrous war; they were ready to join organizations that would represent their protests and their denunciation of the past.”²⁶⁸

The SCAP policies encouraged the union. SCAP ordered the removal of all teachers “known to be militaristic, ultra-nationalistic, or antagonistic to the objectives and the policies of the Occupation.”²⁶⁹ By May 1947, 120 000 teachers or 22 percent of all teachers, had been

removed. Many chose to retire rather than to become the subject of purge.²⁷⁰ However, in 1947 the situation changed. The purge changed to a purge of left-wing teachers. As a result of the “red purge” that started in 1949, 1700 teachers were fired because of their political views.²⁷¹

“The honeymoon in relations between the American authorities and the left-wing teachers’ organizations was now at an end, but it had lasted long enough to allow those organizations to expand their membership dramatically. The left-wing leaders exploited to the full the first period in Japanese history when they were allowed, without any restrictions or interference, to organize, publish and recruit.”²⁷²

The teachers lost the right to strike and Nikkyōso lost the right to negotiate on the national level, which seriously weakened the union’s influence since decisions on education policy are mainly made at the national level in Japan.²⁷³ Though there were conflicts about politics, “it has been in the field of education where [Nikkyōso] has fought its fiercest struggles.”²⁷⁴

School subjects and “patriotism” became struggles that did not ease the tension. It was argued that the learning ability of the pupils was decreasing. Social studies, the replacement of *shūshin*, history and geography, was listed as a reason because it did away with traditional learning methods. The necessity to revive history, geography and *shūshin* was argued. Prominent politicians, among them Prime Minister Yoshida and the Minister of Education, spoke of the need to stress education of patriotism through geography and history,²⁷⁵ which had been reestablished in 1946.²⁷⁶

The Fundamental Law on Education was also criticized because it did not foster love for the fatherland.²⁷⁷ Conservative politicians were not the only ones to criticize the new subjects. Also Marxists argued that Japanese history and geography were being ignored. However, Marxist criticism was based on opposition towards what was seen as Japan becoming a US colony.²⁷⁸

Despite resistance from Nikkyōso and the Socialist Party, Monbushō succeeded in reviving *shūshin*. One hour of moral education a week in elementary and junior high schools was required according to the 1958 revision of the guidelines on education.²⁷⁹

A law was established forbidding the political activities of teachers. The public election of school boards was abolished by the Diet in 1956.²⁸⁰ Before, one third of the members of such boards were Nikkyōso members. After the authorities appointed the members, the percentage dropped to 11.²⁸¹ In addition Monbushō strengthened its control of textbooks. After the war anyone had the right to write textbooks and the teachers could choose among the books approved. The approval was merely a formality. But in 1956 a bill that would strengthen the ministry's control was suggested. Opposition was strong not only from the teachers but also from the JSP and the press. The government withdrew the bill, but Monbushō approval of textbooks became stricter and the prefectural boards of education chose the only textbook to be used throughout the prefecture.²⁸²

When a teacher rating system was established in the late 1950s,²⁸³ new demonstrations and strikes emerged. The system was supposed to rate the efficiency of the teachers, but Nikkyōso claimed it was used to purge teachers with certain political views. 112 teachers were fired, 1018 degraded and 52 273 had their salary reduced as a result of the rating system.²⁸⁴

It is interesting to note that in this case the union in general had the support of the press. Even Yomiuri Shimbun,²⁸⁵ normally supportive of the authorities' policies, urged Monbushō to meet and listen to the teachers. Asahi Shimbun²⁸⁶ argued that Monbushō by refusing to negotiate with Nikkyōso, left the prefectural boards of education in charge of dealing with difficult questions of education.

Though the union was not able to prevent the implementation of the rating system, Nikkyōso influenced the way it was carried out. Often teachers filled out the forms based on Nikkyōso guidelines, resulting in positive ratings. "Thus, concerning the rating system, it appears that the Ministry may have won the initial battle but lost the war." This illustrates that Nikkyōso was far more successful in exerting pressure on educational policy at the prefectural and local levels than at the national level.²⁸⁷

The question should be asked what were the results of the authorities' 'smash the union' policy and the union's resistance? Though the authorities were not able to pacify the union, statistics suggest that it had an impact. Since 1958, the percentage of members gradually declined from 86,3 percent in 1958 to 72,9 percent in 1964 and to 56, 2 percent in 1969. By 1977 the percentage was 55,2, a fairly stable number, but by 1987 it had dropped again to 48,5 percent.²⁸⁸ It seems the struggle had the "effect of slowly but surely wearing Nikkyōso down."²⁸⁹

The period from 1958-1962 was a time of confrontations, while the late 60s was a period of wage struggles and in both periods the percentage dropped considerably. The 70s was a period of fewer confrontations and from 1969 to 1977 the percentage was quite stable. In the 80s education policy became an area of major confrontations, and in the period from 1977 to 1987 there was again a clear decline.

It seems many teachers, politically more moderate than the left-wing leaders, were less willing to stick to the union in times of open confrontation, which

"had harmful consequences because it allowed Nikkyōso's enemies to portray it as an organization dedicated to resisting government attempts to improve education....Because the most newsworthy events of this period always had Nikkyōso in the role of the *opposition* to change...the negative image was usually the more enduring one in the public eye."²⁹⁰

Nikkyōso was not very successful in the various struggles. Despite fierce resistance against the authorities' 'smash the union' policy – especially at the national level, not much was achieved. The union changed to a more moderate organization, which focused more on payment increases and less on ideology.

It seems that not only the union changed its tactics after the years of strong confrontation. While the authorities' old 'smash the union' strategy "had encouraged *Nikkyōso* to fight harder, the new strategy sought to create incentives for teachers to cooperate."²⁹¹

Nikkyōso had fought to improve the salary of the teachers, a struggle that reached its peak between 1966 and 1969, when the membership percentage of the union dropped again. It

seems reasonable to assume that this was not because the teachers did not want increased salaries, but because of the unpleasantness that followed with the struggle. In this period the ministry issued administrative punishment of as many as 240 000 teachers,²⁹² many had their salaries reduced.

A reason why the situation with a political gap between the left-wing leaders and moderate members had functioned was the desperate economic situation after the war. However, the authorities changed their approach. A part of the new strategy was the implementation of the *shunin*-system, a controversial new salary bonus for department head-level teachers, which together with the general increase of teachers' salaries was a part of the Chūkyōshin suggestions in 1971. The *shunin* system was seen as an attempt to divide the teachers and the result was strikes, but general increase of payment was welcomed.²⁹³

The *shunin* system was implemented²⁹⁴ and Nikkyōso achieved wage increases. However, the price turned out to be high. By the 1990s Japanese teachers were among the best paid in the world. "It seems that by achieving these levels of pay Nikkyōso has been a victim of its own success."²⁹⁵ As the financial situation improved the teachers grew more a-political and thus the gap between the leaders and the ordinary members widened.

It seems the new strategy of the authorities was successful, because Nikkyōso was forced to change. Moderates suggested a revision of Nikkyōso politics, which provoked an ideological battle between left and right. "In other words, the union's enemies not only benefited from its chronic, long-term decline in membership, but also from its attempts to find solutions to the crisis."²⁹⁶

The weakness of Nikkyōso was visible even before the end of the occupation. Even though it is always referred to as a single, national union, it was an organization with independent prefectural unions, which sometimes choose to follow the instructions of the national leaders but often not. From the start there was rivalry between socialists and communists. Though the

late 1940s was the peak of communist influence, the rivalry remained and in the late 1980s it became a threat to the union's existence, causing Nikkyōsō to split in two in 1989.²⁹⁷

The conservative forces had served as a common enemy keeping Nikkyōsō together. However, in the late 1980s²⁹⁸ Nikkyōsō faced a bitter leadership fight and at the same time the difficult question of how to respond to the education reforms suggested by Rinkyōshin.

The union opposed the suggestions because of the Hinomaru and Kimigayo guidelines, influenced by the so-called "healthy nationalism and internationalism". It also opposed the proposal of a one year long probationary employment and teaching program for new teachers, which was the main Rinkyōshin²⁹⁹ proposal concerning teachers, arguing that this would strengthen the authorities' control over teachers and education in general.³⁰⁰

Though the factions agreed that they disagreed with Rinkyōshin's proposals, they did not agree on how to express their disagreement.³⁰¹ The left-wing faction favored open confrontation; the right-wing side feared this would cause further damage through the loss of members.

However, it was the discussion whether to join a new giant Japanese labor confederation, Rengō that turned out to be the crucial problem. Disagreements over Rinkyōshin and leadership conflicts could have been overcome by compromises. The question of Rengō was of a different character, and as such it turned out to be the main reason for the schism.³⁰²

In 1987 Sōhyō and Dōmei, the two major Japanese union federations announced the merge to form one all-embracing federation, Rengō in 1989. Because the former was public and the latter was private, it was assumed "the influence of private sector union practice could be brought to bear on public sector unions."³⁰³ Rengō's expressed policy of non-striking, anti-communism and the acceptance of Rinkyōshin suggestions, was unpopular with the left-wing factions of Nikkyōsō. Joining would make real opposition to the 1989 guidelines impossible.

Since Nikkyōso is not acknowledged at the national level, a decision to join had to be made by the individual prefectural unions, resulting in the 1989 annual conference of each prefectural union. A national conference was held in September the same year, and made the formal decision to join Rengō. However, opponents, who boycotted the national conference, established a rival national conference in November 1989, where the All Japan Council of Teachers and Staff Union, Zennihon Kyōshokuin Kumiai Kyōgikai (Zenkyō) was established.³⁰⁴ It affiliated itself with the labor confederation known as Zenrōren, the new JCP-supported alternative to Rengō.³⁰⁵

Some prefectural unions chose to follow Nikkyōso and joined Rengō, when it was established in November 1989;³⁰⁶ others joined forces with Zenkyō and Zenrōren. In as many as 23 prefectures the unions split in two.³⁰⁷ On March 26th 1991 Zenkyō merged with the national federation of senior high school teachers, Nikkōkyō, which had broken away from Nikkyōso as early as in 1951, and formed the All Japan Teachers and Staff Union, Zennihon Kyōshokuin Kumiai (Zenkyō).³⁰⁸

The tendency was that there was more support for Nikkyōso; but there were differences from prefecture to prefecture. After the schism there were prefectures where Nikkyōso for a while ceased to exist. Later, the organization reestablished unions in those prefectures.³⁰⁹ In 2002 Nikkyōso had local unions in all of Japan's 47 prefectures, while Zenkyō had local unions in 31 prefectures.³¹⁰

The revision of the guidelines in 1989 happened at a time when the teachers' unions were seriously weakened as the result of a long lasting struggle against the conservative authorities, which lead an anti-union policy. Thus it seems reasonable to argue the weakening of Nikkyōso through the permanent anti-union politics cleared the way for the conservative forces' eager promotion of the political campaign of so-called "healthy nationalism and internationalism".

Chapter 6: “Healthy nationalism and internationalism” and the legalization

It seems the development described in the previous section made it easier for the authorities to implement the guidelines and that this is one of the reasons for the so-called truce between Nikkyōso and Monbushō in 1994. It is necessary to discuss the developments after the 1989 revision, asking to what extent “healthy nationalism and internationalism” served as a pillar for the law recognizing Hinomaru and Kimigayo as the national flag and anthem.

The 1989 guidelines³¹¹ were supposed to come into effect for elementary schools in the 1992 school year and for junior high schools in 1993, but in fact the schools were made to carry them out from 1990.³¹² Pressure seems to have been a part of the tactics to make schools comply. To increase the use of Hinomaru and Kimigayo the Ministry issued a directive, according to which teachers who did not follow the instructions, became the object of punishment.³¹³

Another measure seemed to be the detailed Ministry polls published every year, showing to what extent the national symbols were used at entrance and graduation ceremonies both at the national and prefectural level, polls that have been conducted since the mid-80s. Prior to 1989 more than 50 percent of the elementary and senior high schools did not comply with the Ministry’s guidelines. The figure for junior high schools was a little over 60 percent.³¹⁴

The 1991 survey showed a general increase compared to 1990 and it seems clear that there was a connection between the guidelines, the increase of compliance and the instructions regarding punishment. It is interesting to note that Schoppa, who is largely critical regarding the success of the education reforms, in 1991 listed the teaching of respectful attitudes towards the national flag and anthem as a Rinkyōshin proposal that had been largely implemented or was likely to be implemented.³¹⁵

The 1991 national average³¹⁶ showed that approximately 97 % of the elementary and junior high schools hoisted Hinomaru at both ceremonies, but the Kimigayo percentage was lower, varying between 80,4 % and 84,6 %. The numbers for senior high schools were lower. At graduation and entrance ceremonies 91,5 % and 91, 6 % hoisted the flag while the Kimigayo numbers were respectively 68,5 % and 69,5 %. 18 prefectures had 100 % compliance. However, there were still prefectural differences. Though the teachers' unions were weakened, there was still resistance against the guidelines.

The 1991 survey revealed that for the first time school principals were punished if their schools did not hoist Hinomaru and sing Kimigayo. Throughout the country 125 school principals were reprimanded. 114 were from Kōchi prefecture, which had had the lowest percentages the previous year for elementary school graduation ceremonies. In 1990 only 33,5 % of the elementary schools in Kōchi hoisted Hinomaru while 14,6 % sang Kimigayo. Accordingly special measurements were taken and although the numbers increased, they were still lower than national average.³¹⁷

It was argued in connection with the 1991 survey that the percentages were obtained through pressure from the authorities,³¹⁸ Nikkyōso saw it as the authorities' use of force. Monbushō on the other hand, claimed that the increasing percentages showed that the guidelines were being understood.³¹⁹

However, it should be pointed out that the focus on these surveys might have been out of proportion to the role the symbols actually played at school ceremonies. Monbushō seemed a little obsessed with the Hinomaru and Kimigayo percentages; it was the only ceremonial fact normally presented. At the national level, school ceremonies seemed to be about nothing but Hinomaru and Kimigayo, as a means of increasing "healthy nationalism". However, to the children involved in local schools, human relations such as saying goodbye to their friends at the graduation ceremony, may have been the main focus – not Hinomaru and Kimigayo.³²⁰

It is difficult to measure to what extent the ministry's wishes were carried out in the schools. What the surveys revealed was that in some way or other the symbols were present, but they did not say in what way. There were numerous cases where the use of Hinomaru and Kimigayo was very different from what the authorities actually intended.

A ceremony took place where it was reported that the vice-principal sung Kimigayo alone accompanied by a tape recorder.³²¹ There were also reports of "principals running the flag up a flagpole, leaving it there for a few seconds, and then pulling it down."³²² Students boycotted ceremonies because Hinomaru was displayed. At other ceremonies teachers and students remained seated while Kimigayo was sung. Furthermore, at many schools Hinomaru was not hung above the stage but hoisted at a remote flagpole well out of the view of the ceremony's proceedings.³²³ Though they were the exception rather than the rule, there were also schools where alternative ceremonies without Hinomaru and Kimigayo were organized.³²⁴

The statistics differentiate between whether Kimigayo was sung or the melody was merely played. However, it does not say how many teachers and pupils sung the song, or if they sang enthusiastically or mumbled. Furthermore the question remains if the statistics can be trusted. With the Ministry's strong interest regarding compliance to the guidelines in mind, there may have been cases where the local boards of education reported that the symbols were used, even though only a few people sung – or mumbled, Kimigayo.

Thus to argue as the Ministry did that the high percentages show that the guidelines are being understood, seems to be based more on a wish than on reality. The Ministry's argument was also contradicted by the fact that since the mid-80s and throughout the 90s many teachers were punished for failing to comply with the guidelines.³²⁵

At Nikkyōso's first post-schism national conferences in 1990 and 1991, though the slogans were softer, politics regarding Hinomaru, Kimigayo and the resistance against the new guidelines remained more or less the same.³²⁶ In 1992 Nikkyōso issued instructions to its

members on how to fight the use of Hinomaru and Kimigayo at ceremonies. Since the 1989 revision numerous teachers became the object of warnings, reprimands, reduction of salaries and suspensions.³²⁷

At the same time the national decline of the teachers' union membership did not stop. In 1991 the percentage dropped under 60 percent for the first time. 59,3 % of Japan's teachers were members of a teachers' union.³²⁸ While the numbers were stable for small unions, both Nikkyōso and Zenkyō experienced a decline. In 1991 35,2 % of Japanese teachers were members of Nikkyōso compared to 35,7 % in 1990. Zenkyō experienced an increase from 8,7 % in 1990 to 10,7 % because of the merge with Nikkōkyō. However, the de facto membership declined.³²⁹

Throughout the 90s the decline continued, reaching an all time low in 2002, when 31% of the teachers were members of Nikkyōso, while 8,2 % were members of Zenkyō. 49, 2 % were not members of any union at all.³³⁰ The continued decline probably reduced the ability to resist the authorities' efforts to implement the guidelines.

The formation of a coalition government in June 94 that made SDP Chairman Murayama Japan's first socialist prime minister in 47 years, would probably not have happened had it not been for the fall of the LDP-dominated 1955 system, under which the LDP had been the sole party of government. To form a government the SDP had to consider its traditional Hinomaru and Kimigayo opposition.

Nikkyōso policy towards Hinomaru, Kimigayo and the guidelines remained more or less the same. However, Adachi argues that without Nikkyōso's adoption of a more flexible approach since 1990, it would not have been possible for Murayama to comment as he did after resuming office:

“Hinomaru and Kimigayo are established as the national flag and the national anthem, and I would like to respect that. However, the hoisting and singing should not be forced.”³³¹

Though Nikkyōso was clearly weakened after the schism – it had lost about one third of its members – it was free to follow a more moderate line of politics. A committee, which was given the task of hammering out proposals on how to reform the education system and the union in the post Cold War world, was established in April 94. It was named the 21st Century Vision Committee.³³²

It published its final report one year later. Some of the revisions such as a more flexible approach regarding the teachers training program and the *shunin* system contradicted existing policies.³³³ Despite heated discussions Nikkyōso policy was changed to comply with the committee suggestions at the national conference in 1995, which the mass media referred to as a historical truce.³³⁴ The former strong objection of Hinomaru and Kimigayo was not mentioned at all, but the more flexible approach towards the guidelines was seen as the acceptance of Hinomaru and Kimigayo.³³⁵

It seems these were changes Nikkyōso had to make, because of the fall of the 1955 system and the SDP formation of government, but also because of the Rinkyōshin and Monbushō policies, influenced by the so-called “healthy nationalism and internationalism.” Though the new policy was supported by about three thirds of the delegates present at the national conference, there were also discussions. As Yomiuri Shimbun argued, the new policies would not mean anything if they did not gain support in the local schools.³³⁶

After the truce, Zenkyō maintained its opposition against the guidelines and the use of Hinomaru and Kimigayo, as it had done previously. Not only Zenkyō but also Nikkyōso opposed the bill that suggested legalizing Hinomaru and Kimigayo.³³⁷ However,

“the union was careful when it issued its statement of opposition to the legalization bill to make sure that this opposition was only incorporated into its policy on political action, not into its educational policy.”³³⁸

This is a fact that shows how the situation had changed and how much opposition had faded. Before the legalization, more than 98 % of the schools used Hinomaru at school

ceremonies, while the percentage for Kimigayo was lower, above 80 %.³³⁹

The developments that have taken place since the promotion of “healthy nationalism and internationalism”, its influence on the guidelines on education through the Rinkyōshin committee and the way the guidelines have been carried out, clearly illustrate the connection between the political campaign of so-called “healthy nationalism and internationalism” and the legalization in 1999.

The political campaign initiated in the 1980s served as a base for the legislation in the sense that the legislation was the result of a process that had lasted more than a decade. In fact it seems it cleared the way for the legalization of Hinomaru and Kimigayo, to the extent that the legalization would most likely not have been possible, had it not been for the politics initiated in the 1980s and the weakening of the union, influenced by the authorities’ anti-union politics.

Chapter 7: The present situation

Chief Cabinet Secretary Nonaka argued that the legislation would not change the use of the symbols in the school.³⁴⁰ In 1998 the education guidelines were revised and were to take effect for elementary and junior high schools from April 2002.³⁴¹ The guidance regarding Hinomaru and Kimigayo at the entrance and graduation ceremonies was in line with the previous set of guidelines and thus mandatory.

It was also argued that the confusion that had taken place at some public schools could be avoided by creating a law that defined Hinomaru and Kimigayo as the national flag and anthem. According to an opinion poll conducted prior to the legislation in June 1999, 47 percent of those asked agreed with this argumentation, while 39 did not. 55 percent said they agreed that the creation of a law would strengthen the enforcement of Hinomaru and Kimigayo within the field of education.³⁴² Has this happened in present Japan? What is the situation like in Japan today?

As noted prior to the legislation, more than 98 % of the schools were reported to have used Hinomaru at the ceremonies, while the percentage for Kimigayo was above 80 %. The year after the legislation the Kimigayo percentage made a considerable jump. The national average for elementary, junior and senior high schools at both the graduation and the entrance ceremonies in the spring of 2000 was well above 90 %.³⁴³ The next two years the percentages continued to rise, reaching 100 % compliance for the first time in connection with the hoisting of Hinomaru at the senior high schools' graduation ceremonies in the spring of 2001.³⁴⁴

The most striking point in 2002 was media coverage. Both Asahi and Yomiuri Shimbun published a range of detailed articles with statistics. However, the 2002 articles were without statistics and so small and easy to miss that one can hardly call them articles, which may imply that the newspapers considered the issue closed.

2002 saw the emergence of national average percentages of 99,9 – 100 % for Hinomaru at graduation ceremonies, while the percentage for Kimigayo at graduation ceremonies varied between 99,2 –99,8 %. The percentages for entrance ceremony were the same.³⁴⁵ Though some teachers continued to object and received disciplinary punishment, in the 01-02 school year this happened only to 258 teachers.³⁴⁶ In numbers, therefore, the authorities can claim to have achieved their goal.

An event that probably served to strengthen the authorities' claim of increased patriotism was the Soccer World Cup 2002, arranged in Japan and South Korea. The support for the Japanese team was strong and a lot of people dressed up in the Japanese team's shirts and used Hinomaru. However, a striking point was how many Japanese dressed up in shirts and flags of foreign teams.³⁴⁷

I conducted interviews in Shiozawa in Niigata prefecture, a city with about 20000 inhabitants, with the World Cup in Japan and the 1994 Lillehammer Winter Olympics as a starting point for talking about national consciousness. Shiozawa is the sister city of Lillehammer, a city of approximately the same size. There were several games played in Niigata and the Croatian team stayed in the neighbor valley of Shiozawa.

I interviewed 15 sixth grade pupils at the biggest elementary school and 15 ninth grade pupils at the only junior high school. The children had not seen any games live, but if they had the chance at both schools 12 out of 15 said they wanted to use the shirt of the Japanese team if Japan played. When Japan was not playing they wanted to use the shirt of one of the foreign teams. When asked why they would also use foreign shirts, the majority said it would be more fun or exciting; they would feel closer to the team they supported.³⁴⁸ A ninth grader said it would be more like a "*matsuri*", or a festival, and thus fun.

Seen in isolation, the use of Hinomaru might be seen as increased patriotism, but taken together with the extensive use of foreign team's shirts and flags, it appeared more like a commercialized expression of 'how to behave at a soccer game'.

The graduation ceremony at Akamatsu elementary school, March 24th 2003

To highlight Hinomaru and Kimigayo's role within the field of education today, an example of how a graduation ceremony is conducted might be useful. As an assistant English teacher I attended the graduation ceremony at Akamatsu elementary school in 2003.

Since September 2002, Monbushō runs an elementary school project to promote and improve English education.³⁴⁹ Nihon Kyōiku Eizō Kyōkai is an organization involved in education programs. As a member of this organization I have for seven months been an assistant teacher at Akamatsu elementary school in Tokyo, a school with 458 pupils and 32 teachers. About one third of the teachers belonged to teachers' unions.³⁵⁰

Akamatsu elementary school is situated in a wealthy area. It is very popular and about 40 percent of the children trying to enter, do not come from the local area. This may result from the fact that the school has been ranked as number two within its ward.³⁵¹ Furthermore, many of the children graduating from the school later enter Tokyo University,³⁵² which is the most prestigious university in Japan.

I was the assistant teacher for the six first and second grade classes for seven months, and for three months I replaced another student as the assistant teacher for the three third and the two fifth grade classes. English is not an elementary school subject, and the teachers' knowledge of English varied from hardly any to basic knowledge. Thus, in many cases I functioned as the teacher. Each class had one English class every second week. I also attended school festivals, as well as the graduation ceremony.

Before attending the ceremony I saw how the school prepared for this day and spoke with the children. The school principal explained the proceedings of the ceremony to me in detail. The fifth grades were in charge of music. They only started to play instruments about one month before, but they were very eager.³⁵³ The classes made an archway of colorful paper decorations and there were rehearsals with all the children taking part.

At the day of the graduation ceremony two big Hinomaru flags stood at the main gate, but the flag hoisted at the flagpole was the school flag with its symbol, a red pine, the meaning of Akamatsu. Inside the hall a Hinomaru, smaller than the ones at the gate, hung on the stage wall. To its right was a ward flag of the same size. The biggest flag was the school flag, standing to the left of the pulpit, which was decorated with a big red pine bonsai. Above the stage there was a school symbol and the largest decoration was a board with the lyrics of the school song to the right of the stage. Below it was another board, larger than any of the flags, with the program.

In front of the stage there were seats for two six-grade classes. Behind them sat only the first and second grade pupils, who had brothers and sisters among the graduates.³⁵⁴ Behind the youngest children the third, fourth and fifth grades sat, the fifth grades with instruments, including a keyboard and a piano. The teachers, including myself, sat along the left wall facing the graduates. On the opposite side along the wall guests such as the head of the local school board on education, the principals of surrounding junior high schools and the parents of the graduates were sitting.

The ceremony was long and extremely formal; inside the hall it lasted more than one and a half hours. In addition, everybody waited close to a half hour before it started and for a long time afterwards to greet the graduates. At the beginning the graduates walked slowly into the hall in school uniforms, while their teachers wore national costumes. The fifth grade musicians played “Pomp and Circumstance” repeatedly until the graduates were seated.

The vice-principal led the ceremony. It was her first time at Akamatsu, but she had performed the same task four times at her previous school. She was anxious not to make mistakes due to the formal style and thus disappoint the graduates, to whom it was an important day.³⁵⁵ People bowed at the vice-principal's command. Then they stood up and sang Kimigayo. It lasted for about one minute and as far as I could see - and hear - people sang, including most teachers.

The daughter of my Tokyo University professor graduated from Akamatsu in March 1999, and at that time the teachers did not sing Kimigayo.³⁵⁶ However, as teachers in Japan change schools after a few years, most of the teachers had changed. The principal took on his position from April 2000, making the 2003 graduation ceremony his fourth.³⁵⁷

After expressing his or her dream for the future, each sixth grader was given a graduation certificate by the headmaster at the stage. The proceedings were formal with a high level of precision. Several songs such as songs from the immensely popular director Miyazaki's cartoons, were played at a keyboard.³⁵⁸

A striking point was that very many of the children – both boys and girls, in the sixth grades but also in the fourth and fifth grades cried. In addition several teachers cried. The focus of the day was on parting from friends and the school, which seems like a plausible explanation for the expression of emotions.

Afterwards there were three speeches. The headmaster spoke of the importance to preserve one's health and to work hard. He stressed his wish to see the graduates grow up to be considerate persons. While the speech of the head of the local board of education was formal, the head of the PTA organization's speech seemed more directed at the children, as it was casual in an uncomplicated language. When entering and leaving the stage the principal and the head of the local school board bowed towards Hinomaru. The PTA representative did not do this.

The next part was “words of parting”. The graduates turned their chairs and faced their schoolmates. Three pupils stood up. After saying a greeting the first sat down as a fourth child stood up, while the second started to speak, a level of precision that continued. The fifth grades responded with greetings; then the graduates sang “My plane”.³⁵⁹ The children replied with a song, then teachers and graduates joined in singing “Goodbye”.³⁶⁰ The last song was “Sudachi no uta”, a song about leaving the nest. Before the graduates walked out to the Scottish “Auld lang syne”,³⁶¹ the school song was sung.

The singing of Kimigayo was different compared to the singing of the other songs. The latter the children sang as a choir, with harmonies it had taken them a long time to master. Teachers said the pupils sang as they had never heard them sing before, reflecting that it was a very special day.³⁶² Though Kimigayo was sung, the school song was sung at a much higher volume and with tears running down many children’s faces, indicating that to the children it is more important than Kimigayo.³⁶³

The first and second grades waited in the schoolyard. All the children and the teachers formed an archway using the decorations made by the pupils. While the musicians played, the graduates left the school through the archway, which marked the end of the ceremony.

I have chosen to describe the ceremony in such detail because I think it shows Hinomaru and Kimigayo’s relative role compared to other aspects of the ceremony. It clearly illustrates that the main focus of the ceremony is not Hinomaru and Kimigayo. The main focus seems to be human relations. To the children the important part of the entrance and graduation ceremonies is to meet their schoolmates or to say good-bye to them.³⁶⁴ Children cry at the graduation ceremony because they are separating from their friends and their school.³⁶⁵

It seems the children’s interest in Kimigayo especially is not very high. It is one of the songs to be learned during the first and second year of elementary school.³⁶⁶ However, it is focused on in every year of elementary school. During the two first years the children are

supposed to become familiar with the song while listening to older pupils singing it. In the third and fourth year they are supposed to learn the lyrics and the music, while the focus in the fifth and the sixth grade is to learn to sing it correctly and to understand its importance.³⁶⁷

It is stressed that it is important for the children to understand the song as a song praying for the lasting prosperity and peace of “our country”, with the emperor as the symbol of the unity of the people. Furthermore the importance of raising respect for the national anthem in order for the children to grow up as Japanese, respected and trusted by the international community, is emphasized.³⁶⁸

The exact same wording is used to explain the use of Hinomaru and Kimigayo at school ceremonies,³⁶⁹ clearly a result of the politics of so-called “healthy nationalism and internationalism”. It is stressed that the symbols are deeply rooted in the people based on a law of habit.³⁷⁰ However, the history of the symbols resulting in their controversy and the hostility with which they are still met in neighboring countries are not stressed. Both aspects are in line with the political campaign of so-called “healthy nationalism and internationalism”.

Though they learn to sing the song, most children do not know its meaning.³⁷¹ The lyrics are in classical Japanese and the children often misinterpreted them. When asked why he does not sing Kimigayo before games, the famous soccer player Nakata said: “It ain’t cool. It makes me feel depressed.”³⁷² By doing so, he strengthens the impression frequently expressed among the young; it is a dull, quite boring song, which sounds much like a funeral tune.³⁷³

Of course the graduation ceremony at Akamatsu elementary school is just one graduation ceremony, meaning that the ceremony can be quite different in other schools. However, with the limited role of Hinomaru and Kimigayo in mind, it is interesting to note that the head of the ward’s board on education stressed that the ceremony held at Akamatsu was a very good ceremony, extremely well carried out.³⁷⁴ Thus, it seems reasonable to conclude that it is the human relations rather than more abstract national symbols that are the focus of days such as

the graduation ceremony. At a time when close to hundred percent of the schools use the symbols, it may be assumed children in other schools feel the same way.

An exaggerated, misplaced conflict?

As noted, Kimigayo is short, lasting maybe a minute. The other songs and various melodies, among them three of foreign origin, were longer and not connected with nationalism. Together with the proceedings of the ceremony, this supports the argument that the extreme focus on the percentages regarding the symbols and the attention in media, are out of proportion to the way it functiones in a school. In turn, this touches on the question of whether the issue of Hinomaru and Kimigayo and the struggle regarding school politics in general have been an exaggerated conflict, taking place in the wrong arena with negative results for school policy.

Though the expression “warfare waged between the entrenched”³⁷⁵ has been used to describe the postwar field of education, based on the Nikkyōso and Monbushō “truce”, the situation today can hardly be described in such terms. It cannot be denied that the conflict has been strong at the national level, but that does not necessarily mean that the situation at the local level was equivalent.

The conflict at the national level was more political than educational, with the two opponents hardly talking to each other and talking of each other in rather hostile terms through the press. To the LDP fighting Nikkyōso meant fighting the political opposition. To run education politics at the prefectural level, not to mention in local schools, in the same manner hardly seems possible. At this level the schools and the local authorities had to face each other, and the principal and vice-principal had to talk with their teachers, otherwise the schools would not function.

Rohlen saw this as the main reason for a rather contradictory situation, with a highly political and confrontational national level, and the smooth, efficient running of schools in the vast majority of cases at the local level. Accordingly Rohlen argued: “the majority of Japanese schools are more independent and less political than anyone would predict from events at the national level.”³⁷⁶

Kyoto was traditionally a stronghold of both JCP and the left-wing faction of Nikkyōso. After the 1989 schism 46 percent of Kyoto teachers joined the JCP-associated Zenkyō, while only one percent joined Nikkyōso.³⁷⁷ However, despite the city being a stronghold of opposition towards the authorities, everyday life in schools may well have been far from these political activities. During interviews a Norwegian woman born in Japan in the latter half of the 1960s who went to Japanese schools in Kyoto until the age of 14, stressed her experience of the Japanese school as a peaceful, apolitical place.³⁷⁸

As a member of the “Exchange students are Teachers” program, where foreign students visit elementary, junior and senior high schools in Tokyo and the surrounding prefectures and make presentations in Japanese of their native countries, I have visited many schools.³⁷⁹ Based on my experience from these schools and from Akamatsu, the typical school seems to be a non-political and rather peaceful place compared to the situation often described by the media and in academic literature. The schools seem to focus not on political issues but on education and problems such as bullying and dropouts.

During the union’s days of absolute opposition at the national level it was “notoriously difficult to separate ‘political issues’ from ‘educational issues’”.³⁸⁰ It may be argued that the Hinomaru and Kimigayo issue as well as the general struggle was a battle in the wrong arena. It is a discussion that belongs in the adult world, not among children. Therefore it is positive if the schools focus on educational issues.

Nikkyōso has traditionally been criticized for putting politics first and forgetting about the interest of children.³⁸¹ It seems reasonable to argue that due to political fighting between left and right at the national level, important problems within the local schools have not been sufficiently addressed. However, it is important to stress that not only Nikkyōso, but also Monbushō was to blame for this.

While Monbushō as a representative of the government, repeatedly expressed concern for the Japanese people's lack of pride in their nation and claimed it merely wanted to restore Japanese pride and patriotism, Nikkyōso fiercely fought this, claiming it would mean the reemergence of prewar ultra-nationalism. Nikkyōso argued that by doing so it protected the independence of children's minds. However, it seems closer to the truth that both sides - on the national level, turned the school arena into a political battleground advocating their own viewpoints instead of focusing on the real, everyday problems schools have to deal with.

Nikkyōso opposed the teachers training program because national and local authorities administered it. To many people the improvement of teacher training was considered one way to deal with problems such as bullying and children dropping out of school. The later more flexible approach regarding the teachers training program was therefore in general welcomed.³⁸² Also after the 1995 conference the Nikkyōso chairman spoke of the importance of focusing on cooperation with the Ministry in order to overcome the problem of bullying.³⁸³ Though Zenkyō feared Nikkyōso was handing over the "control of the education system to the Ministry of Education and the LDP"³⁸⁴, it seems more likely that significant changes can take place because of its more flexible approach.

More focus on everyday school problems instead of political issues can only be positive. My impression based on experiences from various schools, is that the real problem Japanese schools face is not the question of Hinomaru and Kimigayo, but everyday problems.

Conclusion; transformation of “national consciousness” achieved?

The legalization of Hinomaru and Kimigayo as the national flag and anthem of Japan in 1999 was the result of a political campaign to increase so-called “patriotism” or “healthy nationalism”, initiated in the 1980s by conservative politicians such as Prime Minister Nakasone.

Because of World War II to be proud of Japan was a concept with negative connotations. Therefore, the political campaign aimed at increasing the pride of the Japanese in their nation. It was argued that one cannot profess an internationalist perspective without first possessing a clear sense of national identity. The result was the political campaign of so-called “healthy nationalism and internationalism”.

However, the strong tendency to emphasize positive aspects and to ignore negative problems, such as the question of the emperor’s war responsibility and that of the Japanese people as a whole, made it extremely controversial. Furthermore, it served to strengthen the problem of the confusing terms of nationalism and patriotism. The opponents saw the campaign as a possible return to prewar nationalism. Supporters spoke of the promotion of necessary “healthy nationalism”.

This political campaign to increase “patriotism” or “healthy nationalism” focused on the field of education, where the controversy regarding its occurrence was strongest, with the Ministry of Education, Monbushō, and the Japan Teachers’ Union, Nikkyōso, as the main opponents. A council on education was established under the control of the Nakasone cabinet to work on education reform. The report showed that it adopted the way of thinking of the political campaign run by conservatives such as Nakasone.

Based on the report, the guidelines on education were changed in 1989. The new guidelines made the hoisting of Hinomaru and Kimigayo at entrance and graduation ceremonies

mandatory. Previously it had merely been ‘desirable’. Hinomaru and especially Kimigayo – due to its associations with the imperial institution and war responsibility, became symbols of the authorities’ campaign and were resisted by teachers’ unions such as Nikkyōso for that reason.

However, it is important to stress that the struggle that took place – at least at the national level – regarding the symbols’ role was a part of a struggle between left and right in Japanese politics that had lasted since the end of the US occupation. To the authorities, fighting Nikkyōso was to fight the political opposition, and it seems the struggle concerning Hinomaru and Kimigayo was a means to deal with Nikkyōso.

The revised guidelines provided authority, and many teachers who refused to use the symbols were punished. In addition the change of political climate after the collapse of the Cold War system weakened Nikkyōso, resulting in what the media referred to as a truce between the union and the authorities. Nikkyōso gave up its resistance against Hinomaru and Kimigayo, while Zenkyō, consisting of teachers who had left Nikkyōso in 1989, maintained their opposition. Gradually the percentages for the use of the symbols at ceremonies increased.

However, there were still prefectures, such as Hiroshima, where support of Kimigayo remained low, resulting in the tragic suicide of a principal at a senior high school in Hiroshima. This incident seemed to function as an excuse for the government to establish a law. However, it seems this would not have been possible had it not been for the process that had taken place for more than a decade. Thorough discussions concerning the questions at the issue’s core, such as the questions of national consciousness and war responsibility, were avoided and the law was pushed through the Diet within a few months, even though SDP and JCP opposed it.

After the legalization the percentages have reached close to a hundred percent. Accordingly, in numbers the authorities can claim to have achieved their goal. However, it appears that the focus on the use of the symbols has been out of proportion to the role they played at the ceremonies. Furthermore, the picture often described of the Japanese school as a battlefield seems exaggerated. The focus of the school ceremonies appears to be human relations, and the problems local schools face are a far cry from the level of national politics; they are called bullying and school drop outs - not Hinomaru and Kimigayo. It seems that as a result of the focus on politics, important everyday problems within the field of education have not been sufficiently addressed.

It is necessary to ask whether the legalization and the developments regarding the use of Hinomaru and Kimigayo in the field of education indicate that the aims of the conservative forces concerning a transformation of national consciousness have been achieved.

Large argued in 1992, “that Nakasone for all of his rhetoric did not achieve the ‘transformation of national consciousness’... that he had envisaged.”³⁸⁵ However, since then a lot of things have happened. Based on the law legalizing Hinomaru and Kimigayo and statistics showing close to 100 % compliance to the guidelines, Hood argues that the issue is coming to an end, and with it, the discussions.³⁸⁶

As pointed out already the focus on these symbols seem to have been out of proportion to the role they actually play. It may be too simplistic to argue as the authorities did, that their use indicates that the symbols are being understood, and to consider the issue closed. A law does not necessarily mean that the issue fades, just as Monbushō surveys showing high rates for the use of Hinomaru and Kimigayo at the entrance and graduation ceremonies, do not necessarily indicate that the symbols of the nation are embraced by the pupils or the population in general, or that national consciousness has become any clearer. It is interesting to note that Nakasone himself recently stated that Rinkyōshin has failed.³⁸⁷

Within the field of education there has been considerable focus on the national symbols. As a consequence the promotion of a constructive discussion in society in general, concerning the issue's core, has not been achieved, but remained at a deadlock.

Prior to the legalization of Hinomaru and Kimigayo, the government was urged to give the public time for thorough discussions. Unfortunately, this did not happen. The law was pushed through parliament in a few months after the principal's suicide, in what seemed to be an attempt to end the issue once and for all.

By promoting the legalization, the Obuchi government waded "into complex matters of history, memory, responsibility and identity,"³⁸⁸ which should be applauded. The Obuchi government made the issue the focus of national attention in a wider context than what has been the case in schools, in the sense that it touched on a problem such as revision of the constitution. However, the same government is to blame for missing out on an important opportunity to promote much needed balanced discussions about the questions of national consciousness and war responsibility.

By avoiding such discussions, the law, like the guidelines, was implemented from above. And this is its fatal weakness. A law and statistics showing compliance do not mean that the core of the issue has been addressed or that questions that for so long have been a taboo have become any clearer.

Much of the politics of the so-called "healthy nationalism and internationalism" are now an integrated part of the guidelines on education and the "nihonjinron" seem to continue to have a firm hold on many people's way of thinking on Japan. It might be argued that the legislation, in combination with the politics promoted and the "nihonjinron", have made the matter more complex, because of the strong tendency to polish the surface at the expense of the will to deal with negative aspects at the problems core.

It seems the emperor remaining on the throne and not being tried as a war criminal has

had serious consequences. His exemption from trial made it easier for the Japanese government and the people to evade their war responsibility. Accordingly, the fact that the emperor did not step down and the consequences it has had for postwar Japan, is in this sense more important than the question to what extent he was responsible for the disastrous war. Because the emperor remained it became easier to ignore the war and to bury it under a mountain of taboos, so that conservatives can ignore it while opponents can only decry it in abstract terms.

At the same time the lack of dealing with war responsibility resulted in a situation where the shameful shadows of the war made it difficult to focus on positive aspects of Japan in the education system. Accordingly conservative politicians headed by Nakasone, found their chance to express what they claimed was their concern because of the purported lack of national pride among young Japanese. This resulted in the present school guidelines, full of words on internationalization and love and respect for Japan.

However, despite these fine words and the law on Hinomaru and Kimigayo, the core question regarding national consciousness and how to feel about one's country, remains unclear and has not yet reached the surface. The law was intended to end the issue, however, since the main problem has not been sufficiently addressed, the real discussion has yet to begin. It seems that "if Japan wants to fully embrace its nationhood, it must first do the same with its past." Therefore, "to find its future, Japan must face up to its past."³⁸⁹

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 - 4 Asahi Shimbun, 02.03.99; the editorial
 - 5 Kyōiku Iinkai Geppō, number 10, 1999: p. 8, Asahi Shimbun in its 02.03.99 editorial uses the number 18,6 %, but this number does not correspond with the statistics issued by the Ministry of Education.
 - 6 Yoshino, 1992: p. 247, note 7
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 - 27 Yomiuri Shimbun, 04.04.99, the editorial
 - 28 Itagaki, 1999: p. 204-06
 - 29 Itagaki, 1999: p. 202-04, Yomiuri Shimbun, 25.06.99
 - 30 Asahi Shimbun, 03.03.99, the editorial
 - 31 Asahi Shimbun, 30.03.99, the editorial
 - 32 Kyōiku Iinkai geppō, 1999, number 12: p. 39-43
 - 33 Asahi Shimbun, 30.03.99, the editorial
 - 34 Asahi Shimbun, 03.03.99, 30.03.99, the editorials
 - 35 Hinomaru-Kimigayo no hōseika ni hantai suru kyōdō seimei no rokugatsu seimei bunsho
 - 36 Yoshino, 1992: p. 245, note 3
 - 37 Daily Yomiuri Online: The reportage: Flag, anthem—never-ending dispute
 - 38 Yamabe, 1999: p. 19, this was not the first statement given by a government official stating this point of view. In 1984 when asked by Parliament Member Miura about the meaning of Kimi, Mori, who was Minister of Education at the time and who succeeded Obuchi after his death in May 2000, gave an answer quite similar to the Obuchi's. Itagaki 1999: p. 191-2
 - 39 Yamabe, 1999: p. 19
 - 40 Yamabe, 1999: p. 100-02
 - 41 Yamabe, 1999: p. 100
 - 42 Yamabe pointed out what seemed to be a misunderstanding within the Japanese diplomacy concerning the meaning of Kimigayo. On the morning of June 3rd Tokyo Shimbun published an article, which said the pamphlets "Japan and its National Flag and National Anthem",⁴² distributed by the Japanese Embassies overseas were in accordance with prewar textbooks' interpretation of Kimi. The interpretations indicated Kimi as an era of the Reign of the Emperor. To Yamabe this is the only interpretation.⁴² Tokyo Shimbun reported because it was not the official view of the government and the possibility existed the explanation could be misunderstood the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had issued instructions ordering the immediate stop of the distribution. However, Yamazumi Masami, an honor professor at the Tokyo Toritsu University, argued the interpretation in the pamphlet was the true viewpoint of the government.
 - 43 Seron Chōsa Nankan: Naikakufu Daijin Kanbō Seifu Hōkokushitsu, 1999: p. 469
 - 44 Asahi Shimbun, 10.08.99
 - 45 Ōishi, Sōgō Kyōiku Gijutsu, Number 10, 1999, p. 54
 - 46 Asahi Shimbun, 10.08.99

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- 47 Andachi, Sôgô Kyôiku Gijutsu, Number 10, 1999, p. 56
48 Andachi, Sôgô Kyôiku Gijutsu, Number 10, 1999, p. 56
49 Seron Chôsa Nankan: Naikaku Sôridaijin Kanbô Kôkokushitsu, 1978: p. 539
50 Seron Chôsa Nankan: Naikakufu Daijin Kanbô Seifu Hôkokushitsu, 1999: p. 468
51 Seron Chôsa Nankan: Naikakufu Daijin Kanbô Seifu Hôkokushitsu, 1999: p. 469
52 Hanhinokimi Netto, Nihon Kaigi
53 Wilson, 2002, p.1
54 Kemiläinen, 1964, p. 7
55 Encyclopedia Americana 2000, Nationalism
56 Kemiläinen, 1964, p. 9
57 Kemiläinen, 1964, p. 48
58 Shafer, 1955, p.3
59 Encyclopedia Americana 2000, Article on Nationalism by Rita Putins Peters
60 Encyclopedia Americana 2000, Article on Nationalism by Rita Putins Peters
61 Encyclopedia Americana 2000, Article on Nationalism By Rita Putins Peters
62 Billig, 1995, p. 5
63 Billig, 1995, p. 5
64 Billig, 1995, p. 16-7
65 Gellner, 1983, p. 4
66 Billig, 1995, p. 43-4
67 Billig, 1995, p. 44
68 Billig, 1995, p. 55
69 Jean Bethke Elshtain in Billig, 1995, p. 58
70 Billig, 1995, p. 48
71 Wilson, 2002, p. 2
72 Cripps, 1996: p. 103, in Case studies on human rights in Japan/ edited by Roger Goodman and Ian Neary.
73 Cripps, 1996: p. 103, in Case studies on human rights in Japan/ edited by Roger Goodman and Ian Neary
74 Schoppa, 1991: p. 48
75 Large, 1992: p. 194
76 Hood, 2001: p. 35
77 Large, 1992: p. 194
78 Nakasone, interview, 15 March 2000 in Hood, 2001: p. 52
79 Nakasone 1987:13-14 in Hood, 2001: p. 52
80 Mainichi Shimbun, 04.01.1983; 46 % were satisfied with the school situation, 51 % were not.
81 Asahi Shimbun, 13.02.83
82 Asahi Shimbun, 16.02.83
83 Schoppa, 1991: p. 49
84 Hood, 2001: p. 35
85 Hood, 2001: p. 24
86 Mainichi Shimbun, 04.01.1983
87 Schoppa, 1991: p. 3, see also page 4 and 46-8 for further details
88 Schoppa, 1991: p. 159
89 Schoppa, 1991: p. 4
90 Itô, 2001: p. 144, in Yamasaki – Nishimura (eds) “Dôtoku to kokoro no kyôiku” 2001
91 Though Mori was in favor of letting Chûkyôshin handle the issue of education reform, Hayao claims that he saw this as a good chance for promoting his career. Hayao, 1993: p. 151 Mori became Prime Minister in 2000 after the death of Prime Minister Obuchi.
92 Schoppa, 1991: p. 157
93 Asahi Shimbun, the editorial, 22.08.84
94 Asahi Shimbun, 22.08.84, article based on a NHK television program, 21.08.84
95 Rinkyôshinsôkan, Kyôiku Seisaku Kenkyôkai, vol. 1, 1987
96 Large, 1992: p. 194-5
97 Nakasone, 1995 in Hood, 2001: p. 53-4
98 Bjerkholt, 1986: p.44
99 Dale, 1986: p.14
100 Nilsen, 1992
101 It should be noted that this is an area Hood, a supporter of Nakasone, does not address sufficiently, leaving out negative aspects. Professor Amino, an innovative authority in the field of Japan's medieval history, has challenged both the traditional view of Japanese history and culture and the view presented in the “Nihonjinron”.

In various books, including “Nihon no rekishi wo yominaosu”(1990), Amino has initiated a reinterpretation of the entire history of Japan with a new approach and critical insights. In the book “What is Japan” he presents the Sea of Japan as an inland sea and not as the wide ocean separating the island nation Japan from the Asian mainland, which is so often cited as a reason for Japan’s “uniqueness” by the “Nihonjinron”. In addition he points to differences within the country based on cultural exchange among others towards the west and the north across the sea, an approach that clearly contradicts the ideas of the “Nihonjinron”, which tend to stress the similarities of the so-called homogenous Japanese.

102 Interview with a teacher at Shiozawa junior high school in Niigata prefecture, 03.10.02

103 In addition to speaking with friends and various acquaintances, for about one year I have had the chance to visit Bunkyo Gakuin Tanki Daigaku, a junior college for girls normally aged 18-22, next to Tokyo University and meet and speak with the students there about various subjects. Furthermore, as a member of Nihon Kyōiku Eizō Kyōkai’s “Ryūgakusei ga sensei” program (or “Exchange students are Teachers”), a program where foreign students visit elementary, junior and senior high schools in Tokyo and the surrounding prefectures and make presentations in Japanese of their native countries, I have had the chance to meet and speak with many pupils.

104 Article 1 of the Constitution of 1947 states that “The Emperor shall by the symbol of the State and of the Unity of the people, deriving his position from the will of the people with whom reside sovereign power. “

105 Kodansha Encyclopedia of Japan, 1983. Though the headlines of the articles are national flag and national anthem, in the article on Kimigayo it says although Kimigayo “has been popularly identified as the national anthem for many years, [it] has never been officially adopted as such. Hinomaru is referred to as the national flag in both the headline and the article itself.

106 Yoshino, 1992: p. 245, note 3

107 JPRI (Japan Policy Research Institute) Critique Vol 6 No 9 (September 1999); Sheila K. Johnson

108 The information in this section is based on a visit to the Kagoshimashi Ishin Furusatokan, (The Kagoshima Museum of the Meiji Restoration) and an interview with Mr Fukuda, the director of history at the Kagoshimashi Ishin Furusatokan

109 Present Kagoshima. Interview with Mr Fukuda; In order to stand up to the foreign powers Shimazu Nariaki, the 28th Lord of Satsumahan (Satsumaprefecture), ordered the clansman Tahara Naosuke to study Dutch shipbuilding. The construction of the Shōheimaru started at Setomura on Sakurajima in May 1853 and was finished in December 1854 as the first western ship built in Japan. The ship was later renamed the Shoheimaru.

110 Yamabe, 1999: p.27, Itagaki, 1999: p. 192, 236

111 Cripps, 1996:p. 77-8 in Case studies on human rights in Japan/ edited by Roger Goodman and Ian Neary.

112 Senda, 1991: p. 110 (Dainihon Teikoku Kokki Hōan)

113 Senda, 1991: p. 109

114 Heibonsha’s World Encyclopedia, 1988, article on Kimigayo

115 Yoshino, 1992: p. 245, note 3

116 Heibonsha’ World Encyclopedia refers to Ōyama Yusuke, but he was later known as Ōyama Iwao, which is the name used by Kagoshimashi Ishin Furusatokan. See also Yamabe 1999:p.31, the Japan Information Network’s article on the national anthem says that he was later known as Nakamura Yusuke.

117 Information in this section is based on a visit to the Kagoshimashi Ishin Furusatokan and an interview with Mr Fukuda, the director of history at the Kagoshimashi Ishin Furusatokan, see also Heibonsha’s World Encyclopedia, 1988, article on Kimigayo and Yamabe, 1999: p. 31-2

118 Heibonsha’s World Encyclopedia, 1988, article on Kimigayo

119 Japan Information Network, article on the national anthem

120 Heibonsha’s World Encyclopedia, 1988, article on Kimigayo

121 Mr. Fukuda at the Kagoshimashi Ishin Furusatokan, Itagaki, 1999, p. 193, Yamabe, 1999: p. 33, Heibonsha’s World Encyclopedia, 1988, article on Kimigayo

122 Heibonsha’s World Encyclopedia, 1988, article on Kimigayo

123 Heibonsha’s World Encyclopedia, 1988, article on Kyōikuchokugo.

124 Heibonsha’s World Encyclopedia, 1988, article on Kimigayo

125 Gluck, 1985: p.85

126 Osaka Asahi Shimbun, 03.09.1904, quoted in Heibonsha’s World Encyclopedia, 1988, article on Kyōikuchokugo.

127 Kasama, Gakkō Un’ei Kenkyū, number 3 1995, p. 12

128 Itagaki, 1999: p. 194-7, Yanoura, Sôgô Kyōiku Gijutsu, Number 10, 1999, p. 60-63

129 Seron Chōsa Nenkan: Naikakufu Daijin Kanbō Seifu Hōkokushitsu, 1999: p. 469

130 Wilson, 2002, p. 4

131 Kodansha, Encyclopedia Japonica, 2000: article on the Imperial Rescript on Education

132 Gluck, 1985: p. 73

133 Gluck, 1985: p.73

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- 134 Hane, 1992: p. 184
- 135 Gluck, 1985: p. 74
- 136 Gluck, 1985: p. 74
- 137 Nihon no Rekishi, volume 20, Ishin no Kōsō to Tenkai, Suzuki, 2002: p. 296-306
- 138 Nihon no Rekishi, volume 21, Meijijin no Rikiryō, Sasaki, 2002: p. 25
- 139 Heibonsha's World Encyclopedia, 1988, article on Dainihon teikoku kenpō.
- 140 Gluck, 1985: p. 76
- 141 Irokawa Daikichi, op. cit., pp. 440-441. Translated and edited by Marius B. Jansen. Princeton, N.J. Princeton University Press, 1985, in Hane 1992
- 142 From Scalapino, op. cit., p. 150 in Hane, 1992
- 143 Heibonsha's World Encyclopedia, 1988, article on Dainihon teikoku kenpō
- 144 Heibonsha's World Encyclopedia, 1988, article on Kindai no tennō; Hōritsujō no tennō
- 145 Irokawa Daikichi, 1997: p. 291-2 Meiji no bunka,
- 146 Heibonsha's World Encyclopedia, 1988, article on Dainihon teikoku kenpō. The constitution was formally in force until May 21st 1947.
- 147 Heibonsha's World Encyclopedia, 1988, article on Dainihon teikoku kenpō and Kindai no tennō; Hōritsujō no tennō
- 148 Heibonsha's World Encyclopedia, 1988, article on Dainihon teikoku kenpō
- 149 Heibonsha's World Encyclopedia, 1988, article on Kindai no tennō
- 150 Heibonsha's World Encyclopedia, 1988, article on Kimigayo and Kyōiku ni kansuru chokugo, Gluck, 1985: p. 79
- 151 Gluck, 1985: p. 78
- 152 Gluck, 1987: p. 83
- 153 Gluck, 1987: p. 154
- 154 Heibonsha's World Encyclopedia, 1988, article on Kyōikuchokugo
- 155 Gluck, 1987: p. 105-7, Nihon no Rekishi, volume 20, Ishin no Kōsō to Tenkai, Suzuki, 2002: p. 332-4
- 156 Nihon no Rekishi, volume 20, Ishin no Kōsō to Tenkai, Suzuki, 2002: p. 332, Heibonsha's World Encyclopedia, 1988, article on Kyōikuchokugo
- 157 Kodansha, Encyclopedia Japonica, 2000: article on the Imperial Rescript on Education
- 158 Heibonsha's World Encyclopedia, 1988, article on Kyōikuchokugo
- 159 Heibonsha's World Encyclopedia, 1988, article on Kyōikuchokugo
- 160 Heibonsha's World Encyclopedia, 1988, article on Kyōikuchokugo and Inoue Kowashi
- 161 Kyōiku ni kansuru chokugo, 1890
- 162 Kodansha, Encyclopedia Japonica, 2000: article on the Imperial Rescript on Education.
- 163 Tōkyō nichichi shinbun, 2 Nov. 1890 in Gluck, 1987: p. 124
- 164 Gluck, 1987: p. 125-6
- 165 Gluck, 1987: p. 129-30
- 166 Also Kita Ikki, the ultra nationalist who was executed because of his influence on the rebel soldiers attempting a coup in February 1936, "questioned the theory of unity between loyalty and filial piety advocated by the kokutai ideologues on the basis of their belief in consanguinity between the emperor and his subjects." Kuno 1978: p. 75. Like Minobu Kita said that the emperor was "an organ of the state". Kuno 1978: p. 75. However Kita twisted the concept of the emperor as an organ of the state to justify the violent attack on the state and its constitutional government. See Large 1992: p. 60, Kuno 1978: p. 74-80 in J.V. Koschmann (ed) Authority and the Individual in Japan, Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press.
- 167 Ueno, 1994: p. 72
- 168 Ueno, 1994: p. 71-3
- 169 Inoue Tetsujirō, 1908: p. 474-5, in Ueno, 1994: p. 71
- 170 Inoue Tetsujirō, 1908: p. 474-5, in Ueno, 1994: p. 71
- 171 Gluck, 1987: p. 146-50. The Kodansha Encyclopedia Japonica states that pupils "were required to study the text for moral education classes and to commit it to memory. Thus the rescript served as a powerful instrument of political indoctrination for over half a century." However, this is clearly a simplification and the Kodansha Encyclopedia Japonica overestimates the state's control of the school system in the Meiji and Taisho period. See Kodansha, Encyclopedia Japonica, 2000, article on the Imperial Rescript on Education
- 172 Gluck, 1987: p. 151-2
- 173 Ōkuma: Tōkyō mainichi shinbun, 8 Jan. 1907. Ukita: "shinjidai no shimei," Kokumin zasshi 3, no. 7 (Sept. 1912): 19 in Gluck, 1987:154
- 174 The wars against China in 1894-95 and Russia in 1904-05.
- 175 Gluck, 1987: p. 88-90
- 176 Gluck, 1987: p.

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- 177 Gluck, 1987: p. 153-4
178 Hane, 1992: p. 306
179 Bix, 2000
180 Kuno 1978: p. 63 in J.V. Koschmann (ed) *Authority and the Individual in Japan*, Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press
181 Langeland, 1970: p. 427
182 Large, 1992: p. 34-40, *Nihon no Rekishi*, Volume 22, Ito, 2002: p. 14-16
183 Large, 1992: p. 38
184 Large, 1992: 39
185 Large, 1992: 39
186 Heibonsha's *World Encyclopedia*, 1988, article on *Dainihon teikoku kenpō*, Hane, 2001: p. 260-261, Large, 1992: p. 60-5, *Nihon no Rekishi*, Volume 22, Ito, 2002: p.190-94, *Nihon no Rekishi*, Volume 23, Arima, 2002: p. 190-93
187 Hane, 2001: p. 261
188 Hane, 2001: p. 261
189 Hane, 1992: p. 263-4
190 Hane, 1992: p. 264-265, Large, 1992: 68-75, *Nihon no Rekishi*, Volume 23, Arima, 2002: p. 201-4
191 Hane, 1992: p. 265, Large, 1992: p. 68-69
192 Inoue Kiyoshi 1991: p. 67-8
193 Large, 1992: p. 70
194 Hane, 1992: p. 266
195 Najita, 1974: p. 135
196 "There was no revolution, no successful coup d'état, no formal change of the political system. The military-dominated government of the late 1930s was fully as constitutional as the parliamentary-dominated government of the 1920s, though neither was at all what the designers of the constitution had intended." Reischauer, 1995: p. 100
197 Large, 1992: p. 73-4
198 Large, 1992: p. 71-4
199 Hane sees the 1929 and 1936 cases, when the emperor stated his opinion as exceptions. Words such as 'irresolute' and weak willed are used. In addition Hane says that he "certainly cannot be called a leader of men" and that he "avoided confrontation – unless it was absolutely necessary- and went along with what seemed to be consensus." See Hane 1982, p. 49 Hane also states that the emperor firmly believed his function to be limited to that of a constitutional monarch. Hane 1996, p. 18 Wetzler does not agree neither with the conspiracy theory of Bergamini, nor with the constitutional monarch arguments. He sees the emperor as a man to whom the preservation of the imperial institution and his family was the main priority. His interests were constitutional monarchy and the preservation of his house. "For him the former was a means to the latter."
Wetzler, 1998: p.58-9, 177, 180, 185
200 Large, 1992: p. 116
201 Large, *Monumenta Nipponica*, 2000, 56: 1, p. 109
202 Large, 1992: p. 124-7, 215, Hane, 1996: p. 18,
203 Large, 1992: p. 78 He did not participate at the so-called *renraku kaigi* or *liason* conferences where decisions were made. From 1938 he was present at the *gozen kaigi* or the imperial conference, where he was informed of decisions but it was expected that the president of the Privy Council would speak on his behalf. Wetzler argues that the fact that the emperor did not attend these meetings does not mean he did not participate in the decisions, see Wetzler, 1998: p. 32, 39-40
204 Large, 1992: p. 114
205 Hane, 1992: p. 306
206 *The New York Times*, in Hane, 1992: p. 306
207 Hane, 1992: p. 306
208 Hane, 1992: p. 307
209 Wetzler, 1998: p. 199
210 It is interesting to note that while Japan today is still exposed to criticism, the United States in spite of involvement in for instance the Vietnam War, which caused tremendous suffering, today escapes such criticism from the Asian countries. It is argued that this has to do with politics and the continued economic power of the US. See Hein and Selden, 2000, p. 21
211 Quoted after Kathleen Woods Masalski, in *Censoring History*, 2000: p. 281 and 283, edited by Laura Hein and Mark Selden, from: Peter K. Frost, "World History Texts: Coverage of Japan," in *National Review of Asia in American Textbooks in 1993* (Ann Arbor, MI: Association for Asian Studies, 1993)), 57.
212 Minear, 1971: p. 18

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- 213 Minear, 1971: p. 6
- 214 Minear, 1971: p. 35-6, this is clearly illustrated by the fact that concerning the important question of launching wars of aggression, “Only one year before the London Conference, three of the Big Four had gone on record that aggressive war was not in itself a crime.” Minear, 1971: 49-50
- 215 Minear, 1971: p. 15-17
- 216 Minear, 1971: p. 17
- 217 Minear, 1971: p. 93-102, Bix points out that the Allies were selective when choosing which Japanese war crimes to prosecute. Japanese poison gas operations in China and the notorious Unit 731 were not included. See Bix, 2000: p. 615-17
- 218 Minear, 1971: p. 99
- 219 Minear, 1971: p. 67
- 220 Large, 1992: p. 205
- 221 Large, Monumenta Nipponica 2000, 56: 1, p. 109
- 222 Large, 1992: p. 215
- 223 Large, 1992: p. 217
- 224 Large, 1992: p. 216
- 225 Bix, 2000: p. 618
- 226 Yoshino, 1992: p. 207-8
- 227 Hood, 2001: p. 52
- 228 Schoppa, 1991: p. 241
- 229 A *zoku* is a faction of politicians within a political party, who specialize on a certain field of politics such as education, thus the education *zoku* of LDP.
- 230 Schoppa, 1991: p. 211
- 231 Hood, 2001: p. 169
- 232 Aspinall, 2001: p. 112-3
- 233 Asahi Shimbun, 22.08.84, article based on a NHK television program, 21.08.84
- 234 Rinkyōshinsōkan, Kyōiku Seisaku Kenkyōkai, vol. 1, 1987: p. 72
- 235 Large, 1992: p. 195: Large shows how Nakasone and LDP took advantage of the emperor’s sixtieth anniversary in 1986 in order to profit from patriotic atmosphere in connection with the upper house elections a couple of months later and how the conservative forces planned to use the emperor’s death to strengthen the imperial institution.
- 236 Senda, 1991: p. 113
- 237 Itō, 2001: p. 145, in Yamasaki – Nishimura (eds) “Dōtoku to kokoro no kyōiku” 2001, Itagaki, 1999: p. 164
- 238 Monbushō, Shōgakkō Gakushū Shidō Yōryō, 1989: p. 113, Chūgakkō Gakushū Shidō Yōryō, 1989: p. 124, Kōkōgakkō Gakushū Shidō Yōryō, 1989: p. 219
- 239 See for example Gakkō Un’ei Kenkyū, 1995, number 3, p. 19, Monbushō Shōgakkō Kyōdo wo Aisuru Kokoro wo Sodateru Shidō, 1987, p. 33-5, which is an ‘education story’ in order to highlight Hinomaru, Monbushō, Shōgakkō Gakushū Shidō Yōryō Kaisetsu, Ongakuhon, 1999, Monbushō, Shōgakkō Gakushū Shidō Yōryō Kaisetsu, Tokubetsu Katsudōhen, 1999, Monbushō, Shōgakkō Gakushū Shidō Yōryō Kaisetsu, Shakaihen, 1999,
- 240 Hishimura, Gakkō Un’ei Kenkyū, 1995, number 3, p. 29
- 241 Andachi, Sōgō Kyōiku Gijyutsu, 1999, number 10, p. 57
- 242 Gakkō Un’ei Kenkyū, 1995, number 3, p. 29 (Hishimura), p. 38-9 (Shitamura)
- 243 Andachi, Gakkō Un’ei Kenkyū, 1995, number 3, p. 57
- 244 Senda, 1991: p. 109
- 245 “Hinomaru he no Kanshin”, Asahi Shimbun 27.02.1950, quoted in Oguma, 2002: p. 357
- 246 Shitamura, Gakkō Un’ei Kenkyū, 1995, number 3, p. 39
- 247 Monbushō, Shōgakkō Gakushū Shidō Yōryō, 1958: p. 251, Chūgakkō Gakushū Shidō Yōryō, 1958: p. 281 under Gakkō Gyōji. Regarding the senior high school, see the Kōkōgakkō Gakushū Shidō Yōryō, 1960: p. 383. The use of Hinomaru and Kimigayo was later included in the sections on Tokubetsu Katsudō.
- 248 Senda, 1991: p. 107-8
- 249 Oguma, 2002
- 250 Cripps, 1996: p. 83
- 251 Masami, 1986: p. 98
- 252 Monbushō, Shōgakkō Gakushū Shidō Yōryō, 1977: p. 108, Chūgakkō Gakushū Shidō Yōryō, 1977: p. 123 under Tokubetsu Katsudō
- 253 van Wolferen, 1989: p. 292, Itagaki, 1999: p. 164
- 254 Aspinall, who published the book “Teachers’ Unions and the Politics of Education in Japan” in 2001, points out that an interesting feature of the study of Nikkyōsō as an area of objective, academic studies is that until his

book was published the only two book-length studies of Nikkyōsō were written by two Americans and both were published in 1973 (Teachers and Politics in Japan by Donald Thurston and Japan's Militant Teachers: A History of the Left-Wing Teachers' Movement by Benjamin Duke) On why the subject has been avoided by Japanese scholars see Aspinall: 2001, p. 3-4

255 Schoppa, 1991: p. 59

256 Schoppa, 1991: p. 59

257 Bailey, 1996: p. 49

258 Aspinall, 2001: p. 40

259 Thurston, 1973: p. 73 In addition Duke sees the strikes as a reason for the loss of public support, Duke, 1973: p. 149-56

260 Oguma, 2002: p. 354

261 Oguma, 2002: p. 354-5, Itō, 2001: p. 136, in Yamasaki – Nishimura (eds) “Dōtoku to kokoro no kyōiku” 2001

262 Yamasaki – Nishimura (eds) “Dōtoku to kokoro no kyōiku” 2001: p. 201

263 Oguma, 2002: p. 359-363

264 Kyōiku Iinkai geppō, 1992, number 6: p. 32

265 Adachi, Gakkō Un'ei Kenkyū, 1995, number 3, p.57

266 Marshall, 1994: p. 152

267 Oguma, 2002: p. 359

268 Thurston, 1973: p. 48

269 Duke, 1973: p. 31

270 SCAP, Summation, May, 1947, p. 232 in Duke, 1973: p. 55

271 Oguma, 2002: p. 363

272 Aspinall, 2001: p. 32

273 Aspinall, 2001: p. 33, 38, Marshall, 1994: p. 153-4

274 Thurston, 1973: p. 75

275 Oguma, 2002: p. 358

276 Itō, 2001: p. 136, in Yamasaki – Nishimura (eds) “Dōtoku to kokoro no kyōiku” 2001

277 Oguma, 2002: p. 358

278 Oguma, 2002: p. 365

279 Satō, 2001: p. 127-8, in Yamasaki – Nishimura (eds) “Dōtoku to kokoro no kyōiku” 2001, It should be noted that the word shūshin was not used. Instead the subject was referred to as morals or dōtoku and the details of what would be taught were left to the schools and the teachers to decide.

280 Oguma, 2002: p. 358

281 Thurston, 1973: p. 75-6

282 Thurston, 1973: p. 76, Bailey, 1996: p. 80-1

283 Oguma 2002: p.358

284 Duke, 1973: p. 154

285 Yomiuri Shimbun, editorial, 15.08.60

286 Asahi Shimbun, editorial, 30.08.61; the focus of the editorial was Monbushō's policy of the establishment of nationwide achievement tests in five subject areas for all second- and third-year junior high school students, which was another controversial issue opposed by Nikkyōsō.

287 Thurston, 1973: p. 209, 205-9

288 Aspinall, 2001: p. 48

289 Aspinall, 2001: p. 42

290 Aspinall, 2001: p. 47; Commenting on the teacher rating system. This argument is supported by the fact that the prefectures where the confrontation over the teacher rating system was stronger such as Ehime and Tochigi, also experienced the most dramatic decline. In 1964 at a time when 31 prefectures had a membership of more than 70 percent, only six prefectures had a membership of less than 50 percent and the national average was 72,9 percent Ehime and Tochigi stood out with a membership of respectively 9,6 and 3,5 percent. Thurston, 1973: p. 123-7

291 Schoppa, 1991: p. 59-61

292 Thurston, 1973: p. 182-4, 213-7

293 Kyōiku Iinkai geppō, 1992, number 6: p. 33

294 Schoppa, 1991: p. 63, 184

295 Aspinall, 2001: p. 45

296 Aspinall, 2001: p. 50

297 Kyōiku Iinkai geppō, 1992, number 6: p. 34

298 Kyōiku Iinkai geppō, 1992, number 6: p. 33-4

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- 299 Rinkyōshinsōkan, Kyōiku Seisaku Kenkyōkai, vol. 1, 1987: p. 144-7
- 300 The system was introduced across the country in 1989 after it became a law in 1988, though it was not used at all private schools. There were also teachers who were in favor of the new system, which the authorities argued aimed at promoting equality in education. The rotating of teacher, whereby they change school every few years is a part of the system. See Hood; 2001, p. 84-9
- 301 Aspinall, 2001: p. 55-6
- 302 Aspinall, 2001: p. 56
- 303 Aspinall, 2001: p. 54
- 304 Kyōiku Iinkai geppō, 1992, number 6: p. 34: Though Zenkyō had already established itself as an independent union, Nikkyōsō in December 1991 decided to expel the prefectural unions, which had joined Zenkyō, thus making the split definite.
- 305 Kyōiku Iinkai geppō, 1992, number 6: p. 35
- 306 Kyōiku Iinkai geppō, 1992, number 6: p. 32
- 307 Kyōiku Iinkai geppō, 1992, number 6: p. 34
- 308 Kyōiku Iinkai geppō, 1992, number 6: p. 31, 35; High school teachers, who did not approve of Nikkyōsō's emphasis on the elementary and junior high school, had formed their own union in 1951, changing its name in 1957 to Nikkōkō. In 1963 the union split in two, when a left wing faction that opposed the main right wing faction, broke away. Later prefectural unions from both sides joined Nikkyōsō again in the period from 1969-72. Zenkyō joined the left wing faction. For further details see p. 35-7
- 309 Kyōiku Iinkai geppō, 1992, number 6: p. 32
- 310 Kyōiku Iinkai geppō, 2002, number 12: p. 17
- 311 Monbushō, Shōgakkō Gakushū Shidō Yōryō, 1989: the preface, Chūgakkō Gakushū Shidō Yōryō, 1989: the preface
- 312 Senda, 1991: p. 111, Mainichi Shimbun, 25.07.91, Yomiuri Shimbun 25.07.91, Itagaki, 1999: p. 165
- 313 Senda, 1991: p. 111
- 314 Cripps, 1996: p. 84
- 315 Schoppa, 1991: p. 247
- 316 Asahi Shimbun, 25.07.91, Yomiuri Shimbun 25.07.91 Yomiuri Shimbun lists only percentages concerning schools where Kimigayo was actually sung, while Asahi Shimbun distinguishes between schools where Kimigayo was sung (the percentages listed) and schools where merely the melody was played.
- 317 In 1991 88, 6 % of the elementary schools hoisted Hinomaru at the graduation ceremony while 35, 4% sang Kimigayo. Yomiuri Shimbun 25.07.91, it is hard to explain why so many of the principals reprimanded were from Kōchi. The prefecture is rural and does not have any special war history such as Hiroshima, Nagasaki and Okinawa. However, a reason might be that compared to the other Shikoku prefectures, where Zenkyō membership was minimal to non-existent, 21 percent of the Kōchi teachers were members of Zenkyō, which continued its opposition to the use of Hinomaru and Kimigayo after the 1989 schism. Kyōiku Iinkai geppō, 1992, number 6, p. 45
- 318 Mainichi Shimbun, 25.07.91
- 319 Yomiuri Shimbun 25.07.91
- 320 Interview with pupils at Shiozawa junior high school 03.10.02 and conversations with pupils at Akamatsu elementary school, September 2002-March 2003.
- 321 Cripps, 1996: p. 86
- 322 Aspinall, 2001: p. 126
- 323 Cripps, 1996: p. 89-90, see also Adachi, Gakkō Un'ei Kenkyū, number 3, 1995: p. 5
- 324 Aspinall, 2001: p. 206-7
- 325 Itagaki, 1999: p. 164, see also Kyōiku Iinkai geppō, number 12, 1999 p. 41, number 12, 2000. p. 45 and number 12, 2001, p. 43.
- 326 Kyōiku Iinkai geppō, 1992, number 6: p. 34
- 327 Itagaki, 1999: p. 165-7
- 328 Kyōiku Iinkai geppō, 1992, number 6: p. 31
- 329 Kyōiku Iinkai geppō, 1992, number 6: p. 42
- 330 Kyōiku Iinkai geppō, 2002, number 12: p. 21
- 331 Adachi, Gakkō Un'ei Kenkyū, number 3, 1995: p. 7
- 332 Aspinall, 2001: p. 118
- 333 Asahi Shimbun, 13.04.95
- 334 Yomiuri Shimbun, 04.09.95, similar expressions were also used in December 1994 when the chairman of Nikkyōsō met with the Minister of Education and the Chief Cabinet Secretary for conversations. See Adachi, Gakkō Un'ei Kenkyū, number 3, 1995: p. 7
- 335 Yomiuri Shimbun, 04.09.95

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- 336 Yomiuri Shimbun, the editorial, 05.09.95
- 337 Andachi, Sôgô Kyôiku Gijutsu, number 10, 1999: p. 58
- 338 Aspinall, 2001: p. 126
- 339 Kyôiku Iinkai geppô, number 7, 2001, p. 34-5
- 340 Yomiuri Shimbun, 05.03.99, Ôishi, Sôgô Kyôiku Gijutsu, Number 10, 1999, p. 55
- 341 Monbushô, Shôgakkô Gakushû Shidô Yôryô, 1998, Chûgakkô Gakushû Shidô Yôryô, 1998
- 342 Seron Chôsa Nenkan: Naikakufu Daijin Kanbô Seifu Hôkokushitsu, 1999: p. 468
- 343 Kyôiku Iinkai geppô, number 7, 2000, p. 90-91 The lowest percentage was the singing of Kimigayo at the junior high school's graduation ceremonies, which was 93, 6 %. Exceptions from the general rule were Hokkaido, Sapporo, Tokyo and Kanagawa, where the Kimigayo percentage remained low.
- 344 Kyôiku Iinkai geppô, number 7, 2001, p. 34-5
- 345 Asahi Shimbun, 01.08.02, Yomiuri Shimbun, 01.08.02
- 346 Kyôiku Iinkai geppô, number 12, 2001, p. 43
- 347 I saw Italy play Croatia and Mexico and in both cases a lot of Japanese wore the foreign team's shirts, especially the Italian. On TV I also saw very many Japanese dressed up in the foreign team's shirts.
- 348 When speaking with students at Bunkyo Gakuin Tanki Daigaku about the World Cup, many girls replied in the same way.
- 349 English education in Japan is mandatory from the first year of junior high school.
- 350 Based on conversations with the teachers, the vice- principal and the principal of Akamatsu elementary school.
- 351 The school was ranked as number two, only listed after Denen Chôfû elementary school, situated in Denen Chôfû, a very posh area of the capital. According to conversations with the principal of Akamatsu elementary school, assistant professor Yoshino of Tokyo University and acquaintances living in among others Denen Chôfû.
- 352 Conversation with the vice- principal and the principal of Akamatsu elementary school
- 353 According to conversations with the music teacher and the fifth grade pupils.
- 354 According to one of the first grade teachers, the children in the first and second grade classes and the school principal. The reason was lack of space and that the ceremony might be a too hard test of the younger children's patience.
- 355 Conversation with the vice- principal of Akamatsu elementary school
- 356 Conversation with assistant professor Yoshino of Tokyo University
- 357 Conversation with the principal of Akamatsu elementary school
- 358 One of them was "Kantorii Rôdo", the theme song of "Whisper of the heart", based on "Take me home, country roads".
- 359 A cartoon song known as "Boku no hikôki"
- 360 A song known as "Sayônara"
- 361 It is interesting to note that many Japanese seem unaware of the fact that "Pomp and Circumstances" and "Auld lang syne" (a song often used in Japan when department stores and museums etc close for the day) are foreign songs.
- 362 According to conversations with the sixth grade teachers and the music teacher.
- 363 At the graduation ceremony program Akamatsu had printed the lyrics of the school song and the school's education aim, not the lyrics of Kimigayo.
- 364 According to interviews with pupils at Shiozawa elementary school, Shiozawa junior high school and conversations with pupils at Akamatsu elementary school.
- 365 According to conversation with the principal of Akamatsu elementary school and various pupils and teachers.
- 366 Monbushô, Shôgakkô Gakushû Shidô Yôryô Kaisetsu, Ongakuhen, 1999: p. 31
- 367 Monbushô, Shôgakkô Gakushû Shidô Yôryô Kaisetsu, Ongakuhen, 1999: p. 73-4
- 368 Monbushô, Shôgakkô Gakushû Shidô Yôryô Kaisetsu, Ongakuhen, 1999: p. 73-4
- 369 Monbushô, Shôgakkô Gakushû Shidô Yôryô Kaisetsu, Tokubetsu Katsudôhen, 1999: p. 88-9.
- 370 Monbushô, Shôgakkô Gakushû Shidô Yôryô Kaisetsu, Shakaihen, 1999: p. 120-2
- 371 Interviews with pupils at Shiozawa elementary and junior high school 02 and 03.10.02 and according to conversations with pupils at Akamatsu elementary school.
- 372 Newsweek International, March 29th, 1999: When a Flag is not a Flag
- 373 Interview with pupils at Shiozawa junior high school and conversations with students at Bunkyo Gakuin Tanki Daigaku.
- 374 According to the head of the Ôtaku board on education and conversation with the principal of Akamatsu elementary school.
- 375 An expression first used by Rohlen, 1983: p. 211. Used as the headline of a chapter focusing on the period 1950-1969 by Marshall: see Marshall 1994: p. 167

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- 376 Rohlen, 1984: p. 169
377 Thurston, 1973: p. 124-127, Kyōiku Iinkai Geppō, number 6 1992: p. 45, Aspinall, 2001: p. 78,80
378 Interviews with Anne Lande Peters, 2003
379 The number of pupils varied from 6 to 40, but in a few cases hundreds of pupils were present.
380 Aspinall, 2001: p. 126
381 Aspinall, 2001: p. 85
382 Gakkō Un'ei Kenkyū, 1996, number1: p.11-12
383 Yomiuri Shimbun, 04.09.95
384 Aspinall, 2001: p. 98 Aspinall points out that in the first decade after the schism, Nikkyōsō has not achieved much and it seems reasonable to assume that this decline in membership influences the strength of the unions, though one cannot say that the Ministry has used this to promote a return towards prewar like politics, feared by Zenkyō.
385 Large, 1992: p. 197
386 Hood, 2001
387 Asahi Shimbun, 28.07.02
388 Smith, JPRI Critique Vol No 9 1999
389 Asiaweek, 23.07.99

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